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REVIEW ESSAYS
Is Law Politics?
Philip Bobbitt*
A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
By Mark Tushnet. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1988. x +
318 pp. $35.00.
RED, WHITE, AND BLUE:

I.

INTRODUCTION

Red, White, and Blue addresses the pervasive presence of five general
theories of American constitutional law. These theories reflect particularjurisprudential ideologies governing, among other things, the legitimacy of certain arguments, the appropriateness of certain occasions for
judicial intervention and the constitutional basis for judicial review.'
What makes this book interesting and important is that it provides an
unwitting or at least unself-conscious example of the general theorizing
it wishes to explain. For this reason, its descriptions of the particular
family of theories that characterize American constitutional jurisprudence are distorted, while it disclaims any account of the particular set
of objections that the author poses to these theories. Instead, Professor Tushnet relies on the most recent version of the reductionism of
law to politics to explain the failure of these theories: "the crisis of
contemporary liberal political theory. ' 2 But whatever its etiology, this
current crisis can scarcely account for earlier occurrences of these fundamental general theories of constitutional argument. I hope the
reader of this review will be able to see why this reduction, and why the
array of arguments deployed by Professor Tushnet against the theories
he presents (and even his own explanations of those theories), are
largely dictated by the approach he has adopted-an approach that is as
much a part of the traditional family of general theories as any of the
* Cooper K. Ragan Regents Professor of Law, University of Texas at Austin and Anderson Senior Research Fellow, Nuffield College, Oxford University. A.B., 1971, Princeton;J.D.,
1975, Yale; Ph.D., 1983, Oxford.
1. Tushnet identifies these general approaches to the Constitution as "grand theories,"
pp. 1-3, and "unitary theories," p. 181, by which he means something like "ideology," in the
sense of a complete, consistent system of interrelated ideas that depends upon a common set
of assumptions and purports to generate answers to all the relevant questions in the sphere
whose domain is governed by the ideology.
2. P. 2.
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others and to which the current crisis in liberalism, if such it be, is
equally irrelevant.
The first systematic treatment to identify the general theories of
constitutional law as such is my own work, Constitutional Fate.3 This
book set out six archetypes of constitutional argument in the American
system. 4 These "forms of argument" were historical (relying on the
intentions of the framers and ratifiers of the Constitution), 5 textual
(looking to the meaning of the words of the Constitution alone, as they
would be interpreted by the average contemporary "man on the
street"), 6 doctrinal (applying rules generated by precedent), 7 structural
(inferring rules from the relationships among the structures established
by the Constitution),8 ethical (deriving rules from those moral commitments of the American ethos that are reflected in the Constitution),9
and prudential (seeking to balance the costs and benefits of a particular
rule),10
As set forth in Constitutional Fate, each of these arguments or approaches can be paired with an ideology' '-a general theory of how
constitutional questions should be answered and why they should be
answered that way. Each provides, for example, its own justification for
judicial review. 1 2 Indeed, one might say that much recent constitutional theory, as a genre, can be distinguished from the usual previous
scholarship that simply dealt with contemporary cases in a way that assumed one of the archetypal theories. This new genre began with the
self-conscious identification of particular approaches to constitutional
interpretation, with one of which the author usually associated himself.
It has developed into a general discussion of approaches to constitutional interpretation. Red, White, and Blue is the latest and most detailed
13
addition to this genre.
Red, White, and Blue is divided into two books. The first book addresses five of the forms of argument seriatim, but it does so from the
3. PHILIP BOBBrrT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION (1982) (following Philip Bobbitt, ConstitutionalFate, 58 TEX. L. REV. 695 (1980)).
4. Id. at 7-8, 93.
5. Id at 9-24.
6. Id at 25-38.
7. Id at 39-58.
8. Id at 74-92.
9. Id at 93-119.
10. Id. at 59-73.
11. Id. at 57-58.
12. Id at 5, 123.
13. The seminal work is CHARLES L. BLACx, JR., STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTrrriONAL LAW (1969). In the same genre, seeJOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST
(1980); Paul Brest, The FundamentalRights Controversy: The Essential Contradictionsof Normative
ConstitutionalScholarship, 90 YALE LJ. 1063 (1981); Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the
Original Understanding, 60 B.U.L. REV. 204 (1980) [hereinafter Brest, Original Understanding];
Thomas C. Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REv. 703 (1975); Henry P.
Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 353 (1981); Laurence Tribe, The Puzzling
Persistence of Process-Based ConstitutionalTheories, 89 YALE LJ. 1063 (1980);.
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unstated perspective of the sixth-the prudentialist viewpoint. The
second book collects articles by the author on various doctrinal issues
prompted by recent decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court. I believe the
great significance of this book lies in the first part, through its assessment of each of the five general theories. I therefore devote this review
to that part, and its contribution to what Tushnet calls "Grand
Theory."
Tushnet assesses the five general theories by analyzing the particular defense to the countermajoritarian objection to judicial review that
can be inferred from each archetypal form of argument. This is a useful
strategy because it enables the author to convey a good sense of the
nature of each form of argument. The objection itself has been concisely stated by Alexander Bickel: Judicial review constitutes
control by an unrepresentative minority of an elected majority ....
When [on behalf of the People of the constitutional preamble] the
Supreme Court declares unconstitutional a legislative act or the action
of an elected executive, it thwarts the will of the representative of the
actual people of the here and now; it exercises
control, not on behalf of
14
the prevailing majority, but against it.
Of course, merely answering this objection does not constitute a theory; rather, an answer is a consequence of a general theory. Tushnet's
strategy of evaluating each of the five theories by examining and refuting their answers to the countermajoritarian problem would, in lesser
hands, be far from comprehensive. But Tushnet writes with a relaxed
eclecticism, and a very broad view of the objection, so that the most
important characteristics of each of the ideologies are raised. The book
is extremely well-organized, so that as each archetypal approach is
taken up, we can follow a similar pattern of discussion. This is reinforced by Tushnet's own adoption of a uniformly prudentialist perspective throughout the book. Sometimes this perspective forces him to
make really egregious characterizations of particular opinions or arguments1 5 because he is unwilling to take them on their own terms. Finally, however, it is the consistency and thoroughness of his approach
that make this an extremely valuable book.
The real progress to be made in constitutional jurisprudence will
come, I believe, on the basis of the analysis of constitutional modalities,
that is, the ways in which constitutional arguments are made. Red,
White, and Blue is significant not only in its recognition of the centrality
of such an approach-sometimes Tushnet appears to have recut earlier
articles to fit within the modal structure of Part I-but also in its showing of how such modalities are unconsciously applied even by an author
trying to free himself from the grip of a single general theory. How
14. ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 16-18 (1962).
15. See text accompanying notes 155-173 infra (discussion of McCulloch v. Marylandand
Gibbons v. Ogden).
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often does the doctrinalist, in his search for neutral general principles,
behave as though his were the only proper way to evaluate all constitutional approaches? 16 To him, such a search simply does not appear to
be on a level with the search for apt historical or structural arguments.
Tushnet shows us the same is true with the prudentialist.
Though he lacks his sense of humor, Tushnet often reminds one of
17
T.R. Powell, the premier constitutional prudentialist of an earlier era.
It is uncanny to find not only similar arguments, but even similar traits,
in Tushnet's reactions to the ideas of his adversaries. Like Powell,
Tushnet, when it suits him, is more a political scientist than a lawyer.
For example, he treats Brown18 and Roe 19 as if they raised the
countermajoritarian objections of Marbury,20 even though the former
overturned state laws as to which the power ofjudicial review rests on
different legal grounds (the sort of elision a lawyer would never make).
Like Powell, he cannot bring himself to believe that an opponent who
disclaims prudentialism is anything other than a knave or a fool,
whether it is the naive doctrinalism of Justice Owen Roberts 21 or the
diabolical textualism ofJustice Hugo Black. 2 2 Like Powell, he appears
to believe, finally, that law is a species of politics. 2 3 For the prudential-

ist, law must be a species of something, that is, there must be some
external standard by which costs and benefits can be determined. This
explains Tushnet's manifesto that, if he were on the Court, he would
decide cases on the basis of whether or not a particular outcome would
"advance the cause of socialism, ' '24 and his mischievous Powell-like disclaimer, designed to set Dworkin's teeth on edge, that such a program
is really quite "Dworkinian." 25 Yet Powell did not write-perhaps
could not have written-a book like this, because constitutional theory
did not then encompass the analysis of theory itself. 26 This makes
Tushnet a transition figure-not yet freed from the perspective of a
paradigm that is essentially no more general than the ones he wishes to
evaluate, he nevertheless glimpses the great organizing structures of
American constitutional law in a way not available to his predecessors.
16. See, for example, the eloquent ARCHIBALD Cox, THE ROIE OF THE SUPREME COURT
(1976).

IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT

17. See, e.g., THOMAS REED POWELL, THE SUPREME COURT AND STATE POLICE POWER,

1922-1930 (1932).
18. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
19. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
20. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
21. See, e.g., P. BOBBrrr, supra note 3, at 39-41.
22. See, e.g., Thomas Reed Powell, Insurance as Commerce, 57 HARv. L. REV. 937, 982
(1944).
23. Mark Tushnet, The Dilemmas of Liberal Constitutionalism, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 411 (1981).
24. Id. at 424.
25. P. 146 n.130.
26. See, e.g., THOMAS REED POWELL, VAGARIES AND VARIETIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (1956).
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This is, therefore, a book of real importance, not only for what it does,
but for what it does not feel the need to do. Let us examine it carefully.
II.

THE RECURRENCE AND CRISIS OF GRAND THEORY

A prudentialist is someone who thinks everyone really thinks as he does
and despises them for not admitting it.
-paraphrasing G.B. Shaw
Tushnet begins Red, White, and Blue with the observation that
"[u]ntil 1970 those who were satisfied with the work of the Warren
Court felt little urgency in defending it. ' ' 27 So long as there was a liberal majority on the Court, "liberals felt no pressure to develop elaborate justifications for what the Court was doing. ' ' 28 This statement
serves notice that he thinks the motives for rationalization are largely
political, in the sense of power-politics, for so long as you have the
votes there is no need to explain.
It was only "with the appointment of four conservative Justices"
that the liberals "had to provide justifications for the Warren Court
....The result was an explosion of articles and books on the theory of

judicial review." 29 In fact there seem to have been two explosions, one
in the late fifties" ° and the other in the mid-seventies. 3 ' Neither of
these actually correlates with substantial changes in the personnel on
the Court, but rather with the rhetorical aftermath of two highly controversial decisions, Brown v. Board of Education3 2 and Roe v. Wade.3 3 Be
that as it may, however, the confident assertion that articles and books
simply must be the result of changes in the power structure of the
Court not only shows how tone-deaf Tushnet is to the need for rationalization within the law's own terms, its own logic, but also how one's
expectations govern one's view of the evidentiary record. And so, like
the astronomers of other centuries, one assumes that the ground on
which one stands is the one, ideal, unmoving spot for observation.
Thus, Tushnet writes that "[u]nlike the authors of works and decisions
I consider, I am not interested in offering an alternative normative the27. P. vii. But see CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., THE PEOPLE AND THE COURT (1960); HUGO L.
BLACK, A CONSTITUTIONAL FArrH (1968); ANTHONY LEWIs, GIDEON'S TRUMPET (1964); THE
CONSTITUTION AND THE SUPREME COURT- A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY (L. Pollak ed. 1966). See

also articles such as Charles L. Black, The Lawfulness of the SegregationDecisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421
(1960); Louis H. Pollak, Racial DiscriminationandJudicialIntegrity: A Reply to Professor Wechsler,
108 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1959).
28. P. vii.
29. Id
30. See, e.g., A. BICKEL, supra note 14; C. BLACK, supra note 27; LEARNED HAND, THE BILL
OF RIGHTS (1958); Herbert Wechsler, Toward NeutralPrinciplesof ConstitutionalLaw, 73 HARV. L.
REV. 1 (1959).
31. Brest, The FundamentalRights Controversy, supra note 13; John Hart Ely, The Wages of
Crying Woy" A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920 (1973).
32. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
33. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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ory ofjudicial review."'3 4 This agnosticism is clearly what the author is
striving for; it is the characteristic watermark of contemporary epistemology with regard to the structures of language. But no matter how
attractive these current fashions are to the author, he does not think
this way, and so his work takes on the appearance of a rather standard
1960s International Style building that has been tarted up with the cornices, pediments, and so forth of post-modernism. Although he wishes
to expose "the structure of arguments," he never really gets the hang
of this sort of analysis. Instead, Tushnet tends to rely on reprinting
articles about the politics of constitutional decisionmaking, an interesting but entirely different subject, and revamping them along deconstructionist-or what Tushnet takes to be deconstructionist-lines.
This is by no means off-putting; on the contrary, it reveals a conscientious scholar struggling to see his subjects clearly, eager to deploy the
latest and most prestigious strategems but not quite able to abandon
his habitual perspective. Thus, in common with some other members
of the Critical Legal Studies movement, Tushnet appears to believe
that deconstruction itself is a sort of intellectual's engagement, a vaguely
left-wing mannerism that will strip away the pretenses of ruling elites by
exposing the underlying motives and biases in reading texts. But of
course the deconstructionist manifesto is nothing of the kind: There is
no separation between expression and motive.3 5
The standard radical attack on the liberal state attempts to deny it a
legitimacy based on a presumed social consensus. Tushnet puts it this
way in introducing one purpose of his book:
34. P. vii; cfP. BOBBrrr, supra note 3, at x ("Book I shows how the legitimacy ofjudicial
review is achieved. This is a matter of various corridors of argument. Book I1 isan extended

treatment of one of these ways of argument. It does not represent a preferred way; indeed the
very idea of such a preference is incompatible with the general theory.").
35. In fact, the difference between the way lawyers profess to apply the ideas of "deconstruction" and the way in which literary critics have deployed those ideas is so great as to
provide an example itself of the deconstructive argument. The lawyers and the literateurs
agree that the interpretation of texts is dependent on who is doing it. For the literary critics,
this is because the act of reading a text (dependent as that act is on the previous reading one
has done, which will differ from reader to reader) creates a new text. Thus, readers, not texts,
are the instruments of expression. Indeed, even writers are such instruments since they will
put onto paper expressions that resonate with the texts they have absorbed. The writer is not
the isolated creator of his or her "ideas" because inspiration does not, cannot, come to a
blank slate; and the book he or she writes is not complete until it interacts with a reader (who
has, of course, a different context of apprehending, also managed by words). Meaning, then,
does not reside in a text, and therefore can't have been put there by an author.
For the law professor who is eager to appropriate the most fashionable jargon of critique-this sounds dismissive, but is such eagerness anything more than the wholesome and
universal desire to find new metaphors?-deconstruction sometimes seems to me no more
than the claim that an interpreter's bias can be decoded. But since the interpreter here is
usually a judge, and the "text" not just the constitutional one with which the commentator is
preoccupied but also the opinion which constitutes the interpretation, the law professor's
"deconstruction" amounts to no more than a naive attempt to read a text by divining the
intentions (sometimes allegedly unconscious, always political) of the author (the judge), with
an obliviousness to the role of the reader (the law professor), the very thing that deconstruction was supposed to cure one of.
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[M]aking judicial review and its theories intellectually coherent requires that the liberal tradition be supplemented by an alternative program from what I call the republican tradition. [Resort to this tradition
of determining public preferences enables the constitutional society to
overcome the atomism of liberalism which professes to treat all preferences without priority.] The difficulty is that, to the extent that we understand that republicanism is essential to the coherence of liberalism,
we undermine the need for judicial review [which allows the constitutional society to order preferences according to the priority of choices
expressed in the Constitution]. In a sense, the liberal tradition makes
judicial review necessary but at the same time makes it impossible
[since even in interpreting the Constitution the liberal tradition would
alternative readings
not admit preferences with respect to the various,
36
of the choices embodied in the Constitution].
And the obvious 3 7 liberal reply, I would imagine, is not that there

exists a social consensus on any of the controversial issues of the daywhether the eighth amendment permits capital punishment, the first
amendment permits organized prayer in the public schools, or the
fourth amendment requires an exclusionary rule, and so on-but rather
that a social consensus exists as to the way in which such questions will
be determined. This consensus was put in place by the ratification of
the Constitution with its careful hierarchy of federal supremacy over
the states and the supremacy of the constitutional instrument over the
federal government (making judicial review, among other things, inescapable). It is maintained, insofar as judicial review is concerned, by
the legitimizing force of the various forms of constitutional argument,
each of which is in turn the product of the ratifiers' choice of a legal
instrument subordinating government to a popular sovereign. Of
course attacks on that legitimacy occur from time to time; that is what
has made the right-wing campaign on constitutional interpretation so
insidious. One might even say that the secession by Southern states
was an attack on the fundamental hierarchical choices that established
that consensus in the first place. The liberal need not claim that a social
consensus exists on every-or any-particular outcome to maintain
that such a consensus supports the institutions that labor to achieve
such outcomes according to constitutional methods.3 8
It is interesting, therefore, and perhaps ironic, that Part I of Red,
White, and Blue is devoted to a series of chapters that track the forms of
argument, that is, the very methods as to which a consensus exists.3 9
36. Pp. viii-ix. I hope that the bracketed material fairly illuminates Tushnet's summary
of his argument, which is, necessarily, highly abstracted at this, prefatory, stage of his
presentation.
37. For related replies, see James Fishkin, Bargaining,Justice, andJustification:Towards Reconstruction, 5 SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY AND POLCY, 46 (1988).
38. The argument is somewhat more subtle than I have made it seem: as expressed in
the text, it suggests that these forms of argument are a mediating device when in fact they
simply are the way arguments are made in a legal context.
39. Chapter 1 deals with historical argument and contains an appendix entitled "Textu-
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But because Tushnet fails to distinguish these forms when they serve as
modalities of argument from their role as jurisprudential ideologies, he
cannot explain how they might serve as legitimating devices. Thus
their appearance seems so much like a fashionable dressing-up of an
otherwise familiar political discussion of the ideological commitments
of ways of decisionmaking, rather than an authentic analysis of how arguments legitimate and mean, the enterprise that gave rise to modal
40
approaches in the first place.
Why do the same general theories of judicial review recur in each
generation of lawyers and judges? Tushnet appreciates the ideological
commitments of these theories, but not the legitimizing role their arguments play, and so he cannot account for recurrence and must instead
insist on a purely coincidental political crisis. This is to be expected
because one mode-here, prudential-cannot account for the others
but can only evaluate them from its own perspective.
Tushnet notes that "[c]urrent interest in grand theory is striking for
two reasons. First, despite the existence of competing grand theories,
each one is in its essentials a revived and purified version of an earlier
grand theory."'4 1 And he recognizes that "there is something distinctly
odd" about this4 2 but because he limits himself to instrumental, political explanations, not so much rejecting as ignoring the unquiet need
for rationalization that underlies theorizing, he therefore sounds a little
querulous when he complains:
The grand theorists have not explained how their theorizing activity
actually serves their apparent political goals. Theorizing would do so
only if the fact that a decision fit into a grand theory implied that it
would have greater staying power than one that did not fit into such a
theory, but it is difficult to come up with a theory of politics that can
alism." Chapter 2 deals with doctrinal argument; Chapter 3, with structural argument; and
Chapter 4, with ethical argument.
40. For examples of such an analysis that is genuinely based on a modal approach, see
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A ConstructivistCoherence Theory of ConstitutionalInterpretation, 100 HARv.
L. REV. 1189 (1987); see also Marc Gold, The Rhetoric of ConstitutionalArgumentation,35 UNIv. OF
HAROLD H. BRUFF & PETER M. SHANE, THE LAW OF PRESIDENTIAL
POWER 27-29 (1988); PAUL BREST & SANFORD LEVINSON, PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEcISIONMAKING 35-36 (1983); WALTER F. MURPHY,JAMES FLEMING & WILLIAM F. HARRIS II, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 291-301 (1986).

TORONTO L.J. 154 (1985);

41. P. 1. Tushnet cites Ely's approach as a recent revival ofJohn Marshall's (structural
argument), though he is sometimes a little careless about distinguishing between the various

forms. When he writes, for example, that Wechsler and Bickel had developed grand theories
"within the confines of the tradition that Wechsler and Bickel brought to its highest point,"
p. 1, he is confusing the doctrinal tradition with its prudential offshoot. See Gerald Gunther,
The Subtle Vices of the "Passive Virtues"--A Comment on Principleand Expediency in JudicialReview, 64
COLUM. L. REV. 64 (1964), for an incisive demonstration of the distinctions.
42. P. 2. Previous historical examples of this recurrent critique, just to cite a few of the
most obvious, are the debate over chartering the first Bank of the United States during the
Washington presidency, the later bank controversy-and the nullification crisis arising over
the 1832 tariff-during the Jackson presidency, the Lincoln-Douglas debates over the Dred
Scott decision and the significance of slavery for American society, and, of course, the New
Deal constitutional crisis of 1937.
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plausibly support that argument. 43
This misses the point that theory arises from the ways of legitimation and therefore that the theorist may genuinely be interested in
whether a particular mode of judicial review is legitimately mandated
by the Constitution. Furthermore, by tying theory to the perishable
conflicts of the political hour, Tushnet is unable to connect the two
phenomena of recurrence and timing. If he fully appreciated the modal
dimension whose superficial structure he grafts onto his essays, and
further recognized its significance for legitimacy, the connection would
be apparent. Recurrence occurs because the Constitution determines
certain modes of argument by which legitimacy is maintained; the particular timing of a debate occurs when legitimacy is put under stress (as
in Brown, Roe, or the New Deal crisis). Instead, Tushnet observes that,
"the most important aspect of that story [the revival of grand theory] is
the way in which it reflects, indeed is the expression of, the crisis of
contemporary liberal political theory." 44 If this highly implausible
claim were correct, then there would be no recurrence of theories according to a few specified forms (unless a crisis in liberal political theory occurred in every generation and in the same way, and was then
expunged from the memory of ideas so that it could reappear in the
same form).
Accordingly, Tushnet tends to reduce theorizing to tactical political
maneuvering. Rightly troubled that his description cannot account for
the fact that Ely's structuralism "has little to say about the Warren
Court's criminal justice decisions, although they are the ones under
most serious pressure," Tushnet concludes that "[w]hat has happened
is that the liberals have essentially given up on winning anything substantial in the area of criminal procedure, and constitutional theorists
have similarly abandoned the effort to defend a position that has been
lost anyway." '4 5 Among other things, such lame reductionism blinds
Tushnet to the problem for Ely posed by the irrelevance of structural
argument (apart from federalism and first amendment concerns) to the
bulk of criminal law. Instead, Tushnet holds that "it is a commonplace
of contemporary social thought that Western society is currently experiencing a crisis of legitimacy"; that "all the ideological structures
designed to explain why the shortfall is defensible .. .have broken
down;" and that "[g]rand theory and its problems are just constitutional law's version of this general crisis of legitimacy." '4 6
43. Id.
44. Id This is a rare appearance, in Part I of Red, White, and Blue, of Tushnet's professed
allegiance to the Critical Legal Studies movement, a group of contemporary thinkers loosely
associated in part by their relationship to the idea, "the crisis in liberalism." This relationship
sometimes reminds one of the caption in a New Yorker cartoon depicting two dogs in an urban,
decaying environment. One dog, a Scottie, remarks morosely to the other, "Well, I attribute
it to human error. But then," he concedes, "I attribute eveiything to human error."
45. P. 2, n.5.
46. P. 3.
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If the first and second of these assertions were true (and I will say
only that they seem peculiarly dated) then the third should be something like: Grand theory is an effort to restore legitimacy by showing
that the system is fundamentally sound, right or just. That conclusion
would be compatible with Tushnet's view that law is linked to society in
the way that rooms in a house are linked to the house, and thus that the
general crisis is an aggregation of the various crises, and is reflected in
various social institutions. This would permit the conclusion that "the
crisis of grand theory is the form that the failure of liberal political theory has taken in constitutional law." 4 7 This makes the "crisis in grand
theory"-if that is what we are currently undergoing-conveniently coincident with critical legal attack. But is it really? Back when liberal
political theory was riding high, were there not various crises in consti48
tutional grand theory?
And this is Tushnet's initial conundrum: if the "crisis" is local, temporal, and contingent, why does it recur in precisely the same forms?
To account for the ongoing nature of the "crisis," Tushnet finds its
roots in an original dualism that framed the Constitution, but which has
eroded with time. This is the motive for a short essay on liberalism
versus republicanism. 4 9 Yet such an enterprise is both incompatible
with a single modal approach (here, prudentialism, but it could be any
other) and hostile to the desire to assimilate law into politics. For if our
failures were truly the outcome of the breakdown of the original ideologies of the framers, then presumably we would see unstable modalities
of interpretation as well; we would demand the original balance of modalities and reject assimilation or reduction as equally inconsistent with
the initial ideological balance; and we would have held that constitutional structures of interpretation-reflecting a commitment to liberal
and republican ideals-and not the vagaries of day-to-day politics
ought to determine constitutional decisionmaking. None of these conclusions is easily harnessed to a book whose fundamental assumption is
that law is politics-no more, and, to the author's credit, no less.
This explains both the appearance and the disappearance of the essay on two contrasting political traditions that Tushnet calls the "liberal" and the "republican." "One theory, captured in the liberal
tradition, emphasized the individualism of people .... The other theory, recently labeled the civic republican tradition, emphasized the essential social nature of individual being and examined how individual
preferences rest on and constrain social institutions."' 50 There follows
a lengthy description of the liberal tradition. "The liberal tradition
stresses the self-interested motivations of individuals and treats the col47. P. 4.
48. Note that about the time of Daniel Bell's THE END OF IDEOLOGY (1960), the law
reviews were publishing Bickel, Wechsler, Black and even Crosskey.
49. Pp. 4-7.

50. Pp. 4-5.
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lective good as the aggregation of what individuals choose; the republican tradition has an ill-defined notion that the whole is greater than the
sum of its parts." 5 1
[A]s the framers considered questions of fundamental institutional design, they discovered that liberalism and civic republicanism converged
on some important matters [the protection of private property, federalism, separation of powers and judicial review].... These institutions,
however, reduced the dangers that individualism and community pose
to each other only because the framers' society was poised between the
stable mercantilist and aristocratic order of the past and the dynamic
democratic capitalist society that the Constitution was about to set in
motion.
..

The triumph of the liberal tradition has destroyed the coherence

of the Constitutional scheme by eliminating those complementary
52
mechanisms for assuring the preconditions for ordered liberty.
There are undoubtedly features in many constitutions that correspond to Tushnet's description of the "republican": the 1982 Canadian Constitution's guarantees of linguistic rights, cultural rights, and
rights of affirmative action, 53 the Federal Republic of Germany's constitutional right for unions to organize, 54 and so on. But Tushnet's characterization of the original American Constitution is anachronistic in its
depiction of such purposes. One searches very hard to find similar elements to those just given (beyond, interestingly, the right to bear
arms), until, of course, one gets to the Constitution as it has developed.
And there, far from vindicating the charge that the triumph of liberalism has eliminated republican mechanisms, the case law and theory of
the last twenty years stands as a thorough refutation. Indeed one
sometimes feels that for Tushnet himself, republicanism is little more
than what liberalism is not-his description is almost devoid of specific
content except insofar as it would reject those premises that liberalism
embraces. Sometimes one is tempted to believe that this part of the
book doesn't entirely fit, except as a concession to fashion.
Not surprisingly, therefore, Tushnet concludes:
Republicanism made sense only in a specific social setting ...

[i]t is

both unrealistic and irresponsible to suggest that the franchise be restricted once again ....

Republicanism has no strong implications for

institutional design .... Normative conclusions about the present-day
institution ofjudicial review cannot be drawn from the republican tradition. The remainder of this5 5book therefore concentrates on grand
theory in the liberal tradition.
But there are important reasons to attempt, at the outset, to account
51. P. 6.
52. P. 7.
53. CAN. CONST. pt. 1.
54. GRUNDGESETZ (Basic Law) art. 9, abs. 3.

55. P. 17.
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for the recurrence of certain modal forms (and the ideologies that arise
from them), especially if one is inclined to superimpose these forms
and acknowledge their recurrence, while arguing a reductionist thesis.
I take the author's initial postponement of the project, however, as
symptomatic of its difficulty. For the balance of the book, the focus of
Tushnet's attack stems from his realization that "the liberal account of
the social world ...proves unable to provide a constitutional theory of
the sort that it demands." 5 6 I am inclined to doubt whether the "liberal
tradition" is really vulnerable to such a strategy: liberalism is not, after
all, a theory of epistemology, and in any event the liberal agnosticism of
the framers regarding substantive interpersonal ideologies has the precise virtue of not dictating a single mode of interpetation.
In expressing his frustration at this inability to provide determinism,
Tushnet again shows himself to be uncomfortable with a family of modalities, indeed with the modal perspective itself. He writes: "It may
be that we live in a world of tension, in which no unified social theory
but only a dialogue between the traditions is possible. Constitutional
theory is then either impossible or unnecessary." 57 Or rather, a constitutional theory is impossible. This conclusion is hardly uncongenial. I
once asked: "What is the fundamental principle that legitimizes judicial
review?" and replied: "There is none. It follows from what I have said
thus far that constitutional law needs no 'foundation.' Its legitimacy
does not derive from a set of axioms which, in conjunction with rules of
construction, will yield correct constitutional propositions."58 However, in the next sentence I voiced the fear that "[i]ndeed, I would go
further and say that the attempt to provide such a formulation for constitutional law will likely lead to the superimposition of a single convention on the Constitution, because only within this do we achieve the
appearance of axiomatic derivation that the foundation-seeker is looking for." 5 9 Red, White, and Blue amply justifies these apprehensions.
What makes the book particularly interesting, however, is that it comes
after the six forms of argument have been identified, and thus it goes
about its "superimposition" in a very contemporary, avant garde sort of
way.
Tushnet understands that "grand theory's primary function is to explain why the existing system of constitutional law deserves our rational
respect,"' 60 but he seems unaware that he falls neatly within its traditions himself, and thus evaluates other theories from within one of the
classic modalities that define American constitutional theory.
56. P. 22.
57. P. 23.
58. P. BOBBr=r, supra note 3, at 237; see also Laurence H. Tribe, CoNsTrruioNA.
CHoICEs 3-8 (1985).
59. P. BOBBIrr, supra note 3, at 238.

60. P. 3.
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Tushnet often confuses the various modalities, and this failure to
distinguish carefully and consistently among each of them leads to various analytical errors. One reason to use the topology of constitutional
argument is its usefulness in identifying the precise intellectual and
political commitments that lie behind each mode; as Tushnet says, he
wishes "to examine the structure of arguments to expose their sometimes unarticulated presuppositions about the nature of American society."' 6 1 But this requires observing the distinctions among the various
forms of arguments, because they comprise different structures with
different commitments.
One of the earliest books in the genre of constitutional theory as
theory is John Hart Ely's delightful Democracy and Distrust. 6 2 There Ely
introduces the term "interpretivism," which encompasses the historical, textual, and structural modes, as distinct from "non-interpretivism," which is composed of the prudential, ethical, and doctrinal modes
of argument. 63 Tushnet correctly identifies the historical mode as
"originalism" and the doctrinal mode as depending on "neutral principles," but he also sometimes uses the term "originalism" to mean "interpretivism," a somewhat more inclusive term. 64 And he also
sometimes uses "originalism" to include historical, textual, and doctrinal modes, again a larger and yet still different grouping. What difference does it make? After all, it's his book; why shouldn't he use these
terms as he pleases? In fact, doesn't his fresh use of the terms rather
support the idea that texts, and the words in them, are "radically
65
indeterminate?"
Three distinctions can be usefully made. First, "originalism" suggests, at least to a constitutional lawyer, something having to do with
original intent. The "jurisprudence of history,"' 66 insofar as it forms or
is about legal argument-that is, insofar as it is jurisprudence-is relevant to the extent that the ratifiers of a legal act, because it is they who
endowed the act with legal significance, can require that the conditions
for their assent to that significance be observed. We speak of the framers simply because, in the constitutional context, their intentions are
perhaps our most important source of what contemporary ratifiers
thought they were validating. A truly secret intention of the framers,
not disclosed to the ratifiers, might manifest itself in text, but it could
61. P. viii.
ELY, supra note 13.
63. These terms seem at first counterintuitive, since the "interpretivist" eschews interpretation outside the document; and when the book was first widely discussed, but not so
widely read, it was not uncommon for commentators to reverse the meanings of the two

62. J.H.

categories.
64. Compare pp. 23, 51 withJ.H. ELY, supra note 13, at 1-14.
65. See p. 63.
66. This is the title of Tushnet's chapter on historical argument.
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not form the basis for an historical argument in law, though it might be
of great interest to historians. When Tushnet cites the extremely valuable work of Jefferson Powell 67 for the proposition that "[t]he framers
themselves do not appear to have held an originalist theory of constitutional interpretation, ' 6 8 the "originalist" theory to which Powell refers
is a commitment to endow the intentions of the framers and ratifiers
with legal authority.
Second, when Tushnet cites Ely for the term "interpretivism," he is
referring to essays and an important book that distinguished "interpretivism" from "non-interpretivism" on the basis of which argumentative
resources were legally available to the two distinct approaches. The
to "a resort to the document
interpretivist was limited, in Ely's words,
'6 9
itself, its drafting and adoption."
Third, doctrinalism-as many conservative commentators have
pointed out in their objections to a common law of the Constitution 7 0 -is therefore neither an interpretivist mode nor, a fortiori, an
originalist one. Much of the time, Tushnet writes as though he is aware
of such distinctions, 7 1 but they sometimes seem to get away from
him, 72 as when someone has not entirely mastered a particular way of
looking at a problem.
Thus, for example, Tushnet mistakenly characterizes Chief Justice
Marshall's argument in Marbury v. Madison as originalist in the way that
Mr. Edwin Meese's arguments for judicial review are originalist.
Meese, according to Tushnet, argues that originalism is the outcome of
adherence to an "original contract" theory that confers the power of
judicial review on the courts. 7 3 By adhering to the intentions of the
framers and ratifiers, the courts are both required to review acts for
their constitutionality and circumscribed in the approaches to which
they may resort in so doing. Adherence to the original understanding
requires both. In Tushnet's view:
Marbury v. Madison, the Supreme Court's first assertion of judicial re-

view, can be read as adopting a version of the contract argument.
Chief Justice John Marshall justified the exercise of the power ofjudi67. H. Jefferson Powell, Joseph Stoiy's Commentarieson the Constitution:A Belated Review, 94
YALE LJ. 1285 (1985); H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98

H~Auv. L. REv. 885 (1985).
68. P. 24.
69. J.H. ELY, supra note 13, at 1.
70. Robert H. Bork, The Impossibility of Finding Welfare Rights in the Constitution, 1979
WASH. U.L.Q. 695; Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some FirstAmendment Problems, 47 IND.
LJ. 1 (1971); Grover Rees II, Cathedrals Without Walls: A View from the Outside, 61 TEx. L. REv.

347 (1982).
71. Thus he carefully divides a chapter into historical ("originalism"), doctrinal ("neutral principles"), and textual ("textualism") sections; and he writes that "[w]e will see that
these two theories are plausible only on the basis of assumptions that themselves challenge
important aspects of the liberal tradition ... assumptions [that] provide the foundations upon
which both originalism and neutral principles ultimately depend." P. 22.
72. See p. 24.
73. P. 23 n.9.
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cial review by a number of arguments, prominent among which was his
appeal to the idea of a written constitution. According to Marshall, the
Constitution is law, albeit supreme law, and so is to be treated just as
other legal documents are. Thus, when the Court is asked to deter-

mine what the Constitution means it is to do what it does when faced
with other legal instruments. This enterprise is characteristically
"originalist": judges must look both to the words of the document
and, because the words of the Constitution... are too opaque, to the
intent of those who wrote the document. 74

This is very confused, but it provides a good example of the value of
keeping the modalities straight. The Marshall argument is that the
American Constitution, as a written document, conferred only limited
power on Congress (in contrast to parliaments that take this authority
from the sovereignty of the state); therefore statutory acts beyond Congress's constitutional authorization were not really law and could not
serve as the basis for judicial decision. 75 The argument in Marbury is a
classic doctrinalist defense ofjudicial review; it characterizes this power
as an inadvertence, necessary to decide a case because it is necessary
for a court to determine the applicable law before applying it.
Because Tushnet is insensitive to this distinction, he lumps Marshall
in with Meese, and his rather creative addition of the argument "because the words are too opaque"-which does not, as far as I can recall,
in fact appear in Marshall's opinion-brings this out. In Meese's view,
if the words were too opaque to be construed without judicial discretion, the act of the legislature (or the executive) would have to stand; in
Marshall's view, because the power of judicial review arises from the
common law necessity of deciding cases according to law, such a fact
would merely begin the process of decisionmaking and not, instead,
deprive the court of its authority. Indeed Marshall quietly but clearly
avoids reference to the intent of the framers and ratifiers, as regards the
power of judicial review, but instead confines his resort to originalism
to construe the disputed scope of Article III as regards the mandamus

76
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.

Let us then proceed, with caution, through Tushnet's discussion of
originalism. Characterizing originalism as depending on an "original
contract" is perhaps an unfortunate choice, because it may tempt one
into confusing an "original" contract with the "social contract," i.e., in
terms of constitutional arguments, confusing historical argument with
textual argument. The textualist maintains that the source of the Constitution's authority lies in ongoing consent by the People. By not
amending the instrument-and not overthrowing it altogether-the
74. L
75. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) (citation omitted). This is the
intended meaning of the phrase, so absurdly quoted in United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683,
703 (1974) (quoting Marbury, 5 U.S. at 177), that it is "emphatically the province and the duty
of the judicial department to say what the law is."

76. Marbury, 5 U.S. at 137.
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People agree to be bound by its terms. Thus the textualist believes the
proper scope ofjudicial review is confined to giving the plain, contemporary meaning to the words of the text (and neither the meaning the
words may have held in the eighteenth century nor may currently hold
for lawyers). This is complicated by the fact that some of the framers
and ratifiers considered themselves to be textualists, 77 so it is easy to be
misled into thinking that an "originalist" view is a textualist one.
In fact, the framers took the crucial step by placing sovereignty
under law; such a step accounts for why we have a written constitution. 78 And once this was done, the modalities of Anglo-American
legal interpretation-hitherto confined to construing wills, property
deeds, contracts, trust instruments, and the like-became the interpretive modalities for the Constitution. Perhaps it is even easiest to see the
distinction between the textual and historical modes of interpretation
by contemplating the usual legal debates over conventional, non-constitutional instruments, such as the use of legislative history or parol
79
evidence.
Tushnet has concluded that "[a]n originalist approach to constitutional interpretation was not part of the contract the framers entered,
and courts that adopt such an approach cannot justify it merely by invoking the framers' intent."8 0 But this conclusion is fraught with difficulty. In the first place, how could the framers have concluded
otherwise? If in fact they had believed that their intentions should be
ignored in construing the document, then presumably that intention
also should be disregarded; if, on the other hand, they wished their
intentions to govern subsequent construction, how would their wishes
that this be done add anything to the instrument that embodied their
intentions in any event? Finally, letting the argument turn on the nature of the framers' wishes is, for Tushnet, either disingenuous or circular. Circular, because to give significance to their wishes on account
of their wish that we do so is redundant (as Tushnet's locution "part of
77. Tushnet is surely wrong to claim that the framers generally "believed that the meaning of the Constitution's terms was so clear to a fair-minded reader that the Constitution did
not need to be interpreted in any subtle or sophisticated way." P. 24.
78. See PHILIP BOBBrrr, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: THE BICENTENNIAL MELLON
LECTURES AT OXFORD (1989) (forthcoming, Blackwell's).
79. See, for example, Hand's discussion of the World War II Trading with the Enemy

Act:
I don't know how you feel about interpretation. It is a very "chancy" subject. I remember a case we had years ago in the Second War. Congress passed the Trading
with the Enemy Act, as it stood. In substance they said: "We re-enact the Act of
1917." Now, one of the provisions of that act was that there should be no claims for a
seizure of property by the Custodian, which arose after a date before the second Act
was passed. So we had to say whether that could be what they intended. Mind you, it
meant that any seizure under the second law that took your property, although it
wasn't really German property, you could not get back. So we said "No, that is not
what they meant," and we got away with it. I was surprised, but we did.
LEARNED HAND, A

80. P. 24.

PersonalConfession, in THE

SPIRIT OF LIBERTY 305

(3d ed. 1960).
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the contract" reveals); disingenuous, because such a rhetorical device
might easily be taken to suggest that if the framers could be shown to
have preferred historical arguments to, say, doctrinal ones, this preference would be decisive or at least significant, when in fact Tushnet
wishes to withhold from historical resort any such intitial legitimacy.
Indeed, he would even deny that legitimacy to textual argument.
Thus he writes:
Justice Hugo Black did say that [he was "simply enforcing the plain
meaning of the Constitution"] but . . .nobody believed him. Some

conservatives reiterate this position today, see, e.g., Lino Graglia ....
but in their hands it is simply a lie....

[O]ne must merely listen to

citizens addressing their city council meetings to know that for most
people "denying
due process of law" means "treating someone
81
unfairly."
I have left to the notes my reply to this observation. Here one only
need say that neither Powell's superb research nor Tushnet's arguments necessarily mean that courts that adopt originalist approaches
are acting in bad faith. The argument becomes a little more confused
when textualist approaches are assimilated into historical ones, but this
hardly warrants attacking the sincerity of courts or scholars. The example of the city council meeting scarcely disconfirms Black's judgment:
"Treating someone unfairly" (when it is the government doing it)
probably does mean something like "denying someone his rights" to the
average person.
Tushnet also argues that "[a] second problem with the contract argument is that none of us entered the contract. The framers did, and it
might be fair treatment of James Madison to enforce the contract
against him. But he died a long time ago."' 82 This reference to the
framers suggests that Tushnet misunderstands the argument. The
framers' consent is of no more legal significance than the consent of the
81. l On the merits, Tushnet is being careless with the distinctions among the modalities and thus with their constraints: if "treating someone unfairly" is what "due process"
means to our people, then that is what it means, period (for the textualist). These are the
terms of the social contract and the underpinning of textual argument.
Procedurally, or professionally if you like, Tushnet's remark on Graglia's sincerity really
has no place in scholarship. In this, too, unfortunately, Tushnet (who in life, as opposed to
print, is a rather mild, pleasant man) is reminiscent of T.R. Powell, who accused both Justices
Roberts and Black, at different times, of a disingenuousness that amounted to either cunning
fraud or unblemished naivet6. For other examples of this apparent tendency toward the ad
hominem, see Mark Tushnet, Dia-tribe,78 MICH. L. REV. 694, 710 (1980) (attributing to Professor Laurence Tribe the corruption of his academic views by desire for political appointment);
Mark Tushnet, CriticalLegal Studies and ConstitutionalLaw: An Essay in Deconstruction, 36 STAN. L.

REV. 623 (1984) [hereinafter Tushnet, Deconstruction] (ridiculing Renata Adler for her "silly"
review of The Brethren, in Renata Adler, TheJustices and theJournalists,N.Y. TIMEs BooK REVIEW,

Dec. 16, 1979, at 1). It is apparently very difficult for Tushnet to imagine that Adler has
actually considered his point of view and, with great insight and depth in my opinion, rejected
it. See also Tushnet's claim that Dworkin recasts arguments so that he can "forgo the sociological analysis that he states, but appears not to believe, is essential." P. 144.
82. P. 25.
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lawyer who drafts a will; perhaps less so, because the delegates to the
Constitutional Convention were not authorized to do more than recommend changes to the existing Articles of Confederation. 83 Tushnet
continues: "[M]ost of us today-women, blacks, children and
grandchildren of immigrants-are not successors in interest to the
framers in any sense that makes the contract analogy compelling." 84
But the legally significant agreement-the "contract"-was between
the People as endowing sovereign and government. The framers were
no more than draftsmen. If the mere longevity of the settlors were to
determine the binding nature of a trust, we could scarcely have truststhe Ford Foundation, Princeton University, and countless other institutions would have ceased to exist with the demise of their original endowers. It is we who are the successors in interest to the ratifiers of
earlier periods, including, of course, those who ratified the twenty-sixth
amendment in 1971. Can one seriously deny that and maintain that
any law passed before the present moment binds us? In the case of the
American Constitution, the theory of the period held that ratifiers endowed the government, sovereignty having passed to the nation's people by virtue of the Revolution. They, like we, were governed by their
theories.8 5 But to appreciate this connection, one must be willing to
entertain these notions on their own grounds, i.e, without recasting
them before explication. For example, Tushnet writes: "Bruce Ackerman has tried to explain why an originalist theory is attractive for contract like reasons.... Constitutional politics.., occurs during a period
of heightened democratic consciousness, when the public is alert to and
86
seeks to advance the public interest in a relatively principled way."
Tushnet then ridicules this view as resting "on the proposition that
they-the citizenry during constitutional periods-were better than
we." 8 7 However, Ackerman's argument is actually a form of the sovereignty thesis of the eighteenth century. The ratifiers were engaged in
"constitutional politics," following the Revolution, quite unlike the everyday politics that assumes a constitutional context. Tushnet rebuts
this suggestion by reminding us of the everyday political activities of
the framers, who were after all very active in the ordinary politics of the
era as well.8 8 But the mere annotation of the politicking of the framers

should neither shock nor persuade us, unless one assumes that constitutional politics (in Ackerman's phrase) suspends ordinary politics;
otherwise this rebuttal is simply a kind of wisecrack, a sort of innuendo
for civics students.
83. The Convention was convened "for the sole purpose of revising the Articles." Resolve of Congress, passed February 21, 1787.
84. P. 25 n.15.

85. See

EDMUND

(1987).
86. P. 25.
87. Id.
88. P. 26.

MORGAN,

POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION
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Tushnet prefers to offer a defense of originalism on pragmatic
grounds-a foreshadowing of his assessment of each of the principal
modes from the point of view of prudential argument. He writes: "Another defense of originalism is more powerful .... Empirically ....
novelty in tyranny is relatively rare, and because the framers were
rather smart, they managed to preclude most of the really troublesome
forms of tyranny in the Constitution that they wrote." 8 9 Some risks
remain, on this view, but these are less a threat than would have been
the threat ofjudicial tyranny trying to stamp them out in the absence of
the original precautions. "This pragmatic argument is fairly powerful,"
he concludes.9 0
Tushnet then questions this defense from a similarly prudential
point of view that we have come to associate with Michael Perry-the
argument that nonoriginalistmodes of interpretation have, after all, been
beneficial. 9 ' And then, having introduced this perspective, Tushnet
counters it with the usual prudential replies: Some wouldn't agree with
Perry's values, and, in any event, a new court has used these modes on
behalf of political values that neither Perry nor Tushnet would share.9 2
Tushnet's further response to this defense of historical approaches
is also pragmatic: Novelty in tyranny is in fact a substantial threat-e.g.,
wiretapping-and thus we confine ourselves to the drafters' foresight at
our peril: "The drafters of the fourth amendment obviously could not
have contemplated wiretapping when they thought about searches."9 3
But this again confuses historical and textual argument.9 4 Wiretapping
poses no problem for the civil libertarian working in a historical mode,
who argues that the ratifiers were manifestly trying to protect privacy
and the integrity of personal affairs from government intrusion by
preventing unreasonable searches. Whether or not wiretapping provides an example within the scope of such purposes is a matter of conscientiously enforcing the framers' and ratifiers' intent. It is the text
that presents a problem: While the textualistJustice Black consistently
held that wiretapping was not covered by the fourth amendment,9 5 historicists have little difficulty including it.96

Tushnet continues his prudential attack on originalism by saying
that "the Bill of Rights provided protection, such as it was, against [acts
by the federal government] not by the states. Because a genuine
89. P. 27.

90. Ia
91. See generally MICHAEL PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS AND HUMAN RIGHTS

163 (1982).
92. P. 27.
93. P. 28.
94. See note 77 supra.
95. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 364 (1967) (Black, J.,dissenting); Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 74 (1966) (Black, J., dissenting).
96. See, e.g., Robert Bork's opinion in United States v. Mount, 757 F.2d 1315 (D.C. Cir.
1985).
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originalism would thus protect only against limited varieties of legislative tyranny, it fails to achieve its objective." 9 7 Surely the proper
"originalist" inquiry, on the matter of application of the Bill of Rights
to the states, is whether the intentions of the ratifiers of the civil war
amendments were to provide such protection. Even the most ardent
proponent of historical argument does not confine himself to the eighteenth century text out of a distaste for the present. The proper
originalist construction of, for example, the twenty-second amendment
asks what the framers and ratifiers intended at the time of its adoption
in 1951.
Tushnet correctly attributes to the historicist this familiar argument:
Government practices, whose legality was unchallenged by the very
persons who proposed and approved constitutional provisions that are
now used as the basis for attacks on those practices, can't be unconstitutional with respect to those particular provisions. Their peaceful coexistence at the time of the adoption of the constitutional provisions in
question establishes their lawfulness in the minds of the framers and
ratifiers. Tushnet attempts to preserve this argument by deflecting the
98
familiar riposte, Ronald Dworkin's concept/conception distinction,
on two grounds. First, he would require that Dworkin
produce evidence ... that the framers knew that they were enacting
provisions that embodied a moral content richer than their own moral
conceptions. And, simply put, there is no evidence at all that they did.
The distinction relies on modem theories of law that were quite foreign, indeed probably would have been incomprehensible, to the framers of the Bill of Rights and the fourteenth amendment. 9 9
Putting to one side my doubts as to the historical record, a record
that I am inclined to think he greatly overstates, Tushnet again confounds textual and historical arguments. Dworkin is not saying the
framers intended to deploy modem conceptions in the place of their
own and therefore chose the broad language of concepts which the ratifiers approved. (Tushnet's use of the phrase "framers enacted" is
surely careless and, as we shall see, important.) Rather, he is offering a
straightforward construction of the text: Sometimes the language is
that of concepts (equal protection, for example), of others, that of conceptions (the ex post facto provision, for instance). This is very much
like a position that Justice Black took with regard to textual absolutes.
He argued that some phrases ("Congress shall make no law") were ab97. Pp. 28-29.
98. "Professor Dworkin, like Bickel before him, has observed that the Constitution often
provides general concepts-of equal protection or due process, for example-to which each
generation must affix particular conceptions-for example, promoting integration in the public
schools or providing competent counsel to indigents." P. BoBBrrr, supra note 3, at 23 (citations omitted).
99. P. 31 (citations omitted).
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solute while others ("unreasonable searches and seizures") required a
case-by-case assessment.
Indeed, it is an important distinction between historical and textual
or structural modes that "conceptions" originally held do not vary over
time. One sees this distinction and its origin in the political theory that
is the basis for historical argument, by asking what the ratifiers had in
mind when they empowered the constitutional text. The framers may
very well have agreed on broad concepts whose open-ended meanings
bridged various controversies, but the ratifiers must have had conceptions. How else could they have understood the text? And if they had
particular conceptions, then these are the ones they empowered.
There is a reason why we squirm when we learn that segregated schools
existed side by side with the campaign for the equal protection clause,
without a murmur of their relevance during that campaign. It is a good
reason, one that cannot be dismissed by a glib turn of phrase. But it is
not the only reason to construe a constitutional command in a certain
way.
Although Tushnet is sometimes uncertain about the precise distinctions among the modes, he never varies from his own resort to a prudential mode. Yet while he organizes his essays into sequential
treatments of historical, doctrinal, textual, structural, and ethical argument, he has no chapter on prudential argument. Even his defenses of
historical argument-defenses one never encounters in the writings of
those inclined to rely on historical approaches exclusively, like Raoul
Berger-are prudentialist. Thus, he writes:
[O]riginalists can argue ...that originalism is better than the alternatives. It gives us a Constitution with many opportunities for legislative
tyranny, some (though few) limits on legislatures, stringent limits on
judges, and few opportunities for judicial tyranny. The alternatives
provide many opportunities for judicial tyranny, few limits on judges,
and an unknown
mixture of opportunities for and limits on legislative
10 0
tyranny.
The prudentialist must rely on some standard external to the law to
enable the measurement of the "better." Here, it is the constraint on
judges. But the full-bore historicist would simply say that we rely on
the original intent because that is the lawful way to act; whether it is
practical to do so is not a constitutional question. Because Tushnet so
resolutely refuses to see this, and thus overlooks the difference between
historical argument and historical analysis, he can perhaps be acquitted
of the charge of gross unfairness to Berger. Having given some of the
rules of construction that Berger derives from his historical approach, 0 1 Tushnet at first mildly offers a purely pragmatic guess as to
what usefulness they have ("They may be crystallized expressions of

I00. P. 32 (emphasis added).
101. RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT

BYJUDICIARY 1-19 (1977); P. 36.
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what more detailed inquiries have shown to have been usually
true"). 10 2 He then savagely contrasts these highly reified rules with the
detailed historical contexts that one finds in historical work. Tushnet
concludes: "It is almost painful to read Berger's work after
reading a
03
far more subtle study by a serious historian, J. R. Pole."'
But Berger's rules are legal rules, common law rules of construction
that have little to do with historical analysis as practiced by professional
historians, even when they are writing on legal events of great historical
significance. It is as if, for Tushnet, historical argument is just something about the past. Thus Tushnet gives Justice Brandeis's classic expression of the purpose of the free speech clause in Whitney v. California
as "the best example in the case law of a hermeneutic effort to understand the past,"' 0 4 when it is really no such thing. Indeed, that is why
Justice Brandeis gives us no citations to historical sources; it is a purely
prudential expression of the purpose of the amendment. Although it
associates the speaker's understanding with that of the founders of the
Republic ("those who won our independence"), it is by no means a
historical argument. Had Justice Brandeis intended to make such an
argument, he would have associated the views he was professing with
those of the framers and ratifiers of the fourteenth amendment, on
which he decided the case, for he was not careless about such things.
Thus, Tushnet, having no idea why the intentions of the framers
should have legal significance-or indeed why any conclusion outside
the pragmatic should have legal significance-hypothesizes an "intuitive" appeal that accounts for the stubborn adherence to historical approaches. He then discredits this appeal as unrealistic, and impossible
of practical satisfaction:
The dilemma of originalism is that if it is to rely on a real grasp of
the framer's intention-and only this premise gives originalism its intuitive appeal-its method must be hermeneutic, but if it adopts a hermeneutic approach it is foreclosed from achieving the determinacy about
the framers' meanings necessary to serve its underlying goals. 10 5
He adds: "Originalism attributes our choices to people in the past and
so displaces our responsibility for constructing our society on the basis
06
of the continuities we choose to make with our past."'
Can both these charges be true? If historical argument does not
provide determinant answers, can we also then say that we do not
have-indeed are we not compelled to have-the responsibility of constituting the continuities we choose to make with our past? Isn't this, in
the last analysis, what distinguishes legal-historical argument from the
work of historians generally: that it requires us to choose with the legal
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

P.
P.
P.
P.
P.

37.
37 n.55.
40.
46.
45.

is
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context in mind, and is neither determinative, nor a search for the determinative? This in turn requires us to distinguish historical argument-a modality of legal discourse about the Constitution-from the
ideology of constitutional historicists whose search for the determinative is like that of the other ideologues of constitutional method: a
search for a means of silence-to silence critics, to silence the nagging
of one's own doubts, and above all, to silence responsibility.
Tushnet's conclusion is that "[t]he hermeneutic tradition suggests
that historical discontinuities are so substantial that originalism must
make incoherent claims because it can achieve the necessary determinacy about past intentions only by smuggling in an10 7implausible claim
about the ability to retrieve meaning across time."
Thus, Tushnet disclaims what he is doing by doing it-preferring
one mode to the others on the basis of modal values outside the modality he is describing. He evaluates the modality of historical argument
prudentially, judging it against a standard of determinacy since determinacy is claimed to be a necessary condition for achieving the laudable
goal of judicial constraint.
IV.

DOCTRINAL ARGUMENT

Tushnet confuses argumentative modalities-how assertions are determined to be correct-with the ideologies to which they give risewhy claims from a particular perspective are constitutionally justifiable.
He erroneously concludes that the epistemological shortcomings of the
various constitutional ideologies render the forms of argument useless.
In particular, Tushnet's demand for determinacy, which is a demand of
a single ideology, leads him to reject doctrinal argument as a legitimate
form of argument. This treatment of modality as ideology manifests
the usual confusion that mixes the justification for judicial review (which
must come from grounds external to its practice) and the legitimacy of
review (which is maintained by adherence to rules within the practice).
I shall return to this distinction.
Tushnet correctly sees the general approach associated with doctrinal argument as relying on the search for impersonal and durable principles of constitutional law that are neutralwith respect to the parties or
groups in society and are general with respect to stare decisis. 108 But he
conflates this approach with its jurisprudential lobby, the Legal Process
school. Thus he writes:
The theory of neutral principles ....requires that we develop an account of consistency of meaning. . . within the liberal tradition. Yet
the premises of that tradition tend to treat each of us as an autonomous
107.
108.
HARM. L.
REv. 84,

P. 46.
Id See, e.g., Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of ConstitutionalLaw, 73
REV. 1 (1959); Henry M. Hart,Jr., Foreword- The Time Chart of the Justices, 73 HAv.L.
108-11 (1959). See also P. BOBBrrr, supra note 3, at 39.
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individual whose choices and values are independent of those made
and held by others. These premises make it exceedingly difficult to
develop such an account of consistent meaning. The autonomous producer of1 09choice and value is also an autonomous producer of
meaning.
But liberalism is not a theory of metaphysics; the liberal may very
well wish that decisions be as decentralized as possible, and the individual conscience respected, without subscribing to the doctrine of monads. Indeed, a liberal might even be a phenomenological
determinist-as appears to have been the case with the very humane
Spinoza'' 0 -and still believe that disputes ought to be settled by consistent, public methods according to neutral principles of general and
not privileged application. The liberal would simply deny that the motive force for his actions was an existential virtue. Moreover, liberalism's "premises" do not "tend to treat each of [the judges] as an
autonomous individual whose choices and values are independent of
those made and held by others."'1 1 To the extent that a judge, for
example, is exempted from the pleadings of a case, or the available
precedents, or the need to make a decision that is coherent to the parties (or which will persuade a reviewing court or command a majority
on a multi-member panel), he has shoved off from the moorings of doctrinalism. Perhaps that is why such approaches always focus on the
common law tradition of deciding appeals.
The whole point of autonomy is to provide a role for moral decision; that role takes place after the decision is well-defined." 2 In that
way we neither require determinacy nor risk arbitrariness; but that is
not the reason we adhere to doctrinal argument. By contrast, Tushnet
writes:
The rule of law, according to the liberal conception, is meant to protect
us against the exercise of arbitrary power. The theory of neutral principles asserts that a requirement of consistency, the core of the ideal of
the rule of law, places sufficient bounds on judges to reduce the risk of
arbitrariness to an acceptable level. The question is whether the concepts of neutrality and consistency can be developed in ways that are
13
adequate for the task. "
Note, however, that this is a prudential justification for a doctrinal
argument. Henry Hart, a doctrinalist, put it differently. The court
is predestinedin the long run not only by the thrilling tradition of AngloAmerican law but also by the hard facts of its position in the structure
of American institutions to be a voice of reason, charged with the creative function of discerning afresh and of articulating and developing
109. P. 46.
110.

See, e.g., R. A. DUFF, SPINOZA'S POLITICAL AND ETHICAL PHILOSOPHY (1903).

111. P. 46.
112. See P. BOBBrrF, supra note 71.
113. P. 46.
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impersonal and durable principles of constitutional law. 1 14
This is reminiscent of Marshall's doctrinal argument forjudicial review:
that judicial review is unavoidable if the Court is to decide the cases
committed to it.' 5 This argument does not weigh the benefits of such
a role. Having established a prudential standard for this form of argument, however, Tushnet, not surprisingly, finds doctrinalism wanting.
Tushnet continues, "This section argues that each [of two possible
types of neutrality] fails to provide the kinds of constraints on judges
that the liberal tradition requires: The limits they place on judges are
either empty or dependent on a sociology of law that undermines the
liberal tradition's assumptions about society." 1 16 This argument assumes first that constraints are the point (a prudential assumption); and
second, that the liberal tradition is a necessary parameter. The latter is
an ideological assumption, that is, it assumes that an argumentative
mode must be an all-embracing set of explanations, like Marxism or
Behaviorism. It might well suit a judge, when told that the philosophers of the liberal tradition hold views that are inadequate to explain
the operation of the common law, to reply: So what?
Notice how Tushnet introduces the prudential requirement and
then uses it to dash the entire doctrinal approach:
One preliminary difficulty should be noted. The demand for neutral
application ultimately rests on the claim that without neutrality a decision "wholly lack[s] ... legitimacy." Legitimacy is a matter of concordance with the demands of this ideal. These demands, however,
ultimately prove empty, for rather than constrain the proper role of
courts the concept of neutrality presupposes
a shared understanding
7
and acceptance of any constraints. 1
Yet stripped of the demand for an external constraint, how is this
juxtaposition inconsistent (as suggested by the phrase "for rather")?
Indeed, how could it be otherwise, that is, how could there be rulefollowing without shared understanding? And if it could not be otherwise, then must one conclude with Tushnet that the entire enterprise is
an impossibility, or conclude instead that that is all it means to be neutral-to be able to follow a rule.
Legitimacy is a matter of following a form of argument. Doing so
does not insure the best outcome, only a legitimate one. External standards of comparison-like whether following a particular form is sufficiently constraining-go to the issue of justification. A confusion
between these two concepts accounts for Tushnet's oscillation between
the methodology and the ideology of doctrinal argument.
Tushnet asks: "What, then, are methodologically neutral princi114.
115.
116.
117.

Hart, supra note 108, at 99 (emphasis added).
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
P. 46.
Pp. 46-47 (footnote omitted).
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ples? The best explication looks to the past. It would impose as a necessary condition for justification that a decision be consistent with the
relevant precedents." ' 18 But reliance on stare decisis is not a necessary
pre-condition for decisions according to doctrinal rules. If it were,
overruling precedent would be illegitimate within this modality. Rather
it is one means of insuring generality that, along with neutrality, is a necessary condition. Merely insuring that a particular holding follows precedent-a way, but not the only way, of insuring generality-will not
justify a decision. As Holmes, our greatest doctrinalist, put it in his
celebrated epigram, "It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule
of law than that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV."' 19
Tushnet does appreciate the claim of doctrinalists that it is the way
in which they reach decisions that gives their holdings legitimacy; 120
indeed, he finds this claim highly dubious. "It is implausible.., that
neutral application of principles is an important source of public acceptance of judicial decisions. The general public is unlikely to care
very much about a court's reasoning process, which is the focus of neu2
tral principles theory; its concern is with results."' '
This observation supports the view that Tushnet is evaluating each
of five various forms of argument from the point of view of the sixth,
prudential argument. The standard he believes will determine legitimacy is that which the prudentialist sets for constitutional decision: the
results. But if we were to take the doctrinalist claim seriously, is it so
obvious that reasoned elaboration is irrelevant to legitimacy? I am inclined to think the public cares very much about how a judge reaches a
decision, as we would discover if a judge rendered a decision saying
that his astrologer told him to decide a certain way, or acknowledging
that he had been paid by one of the parties to decide as he did. No
doubt all Tushnet really means to say is that the public doesn't read
judicial opinions, and that this lack of study is indicative of its true level
of concern. But although I don't read biology journals, I would be very
upset if I came to believe that some American Lysenko was being
foisted off on the discipline by the political authorities; and I would rely
on the biologists to tell me if this were the case.
Tushnet's chief complaint, however, is not that doctrinalism doesn't
work-that it doesn't maintain the legitimacy of decisions made on that
basis-but that it can't work because it fails to provide the determinacy
that, in his view, is required: "At the moment a decision is announced
we cannot identify the principle that it embodies. Each decision can be
justified by many principles, and we learn what principle justified Case
118. P. 47.
119. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 457, 469 (1897).
120. It is not clear whether he appreciates that this is true with all the forms of

argument.
121. P. 47 n.79.
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1 only when a Court in Case 2 tells us." '122

This can't be quite right, because if it were true, then it would apply
to itself; that is, it would be a Case 2 for some other Case 1. But in any
event this is only a way-station to the conclusion that "[t]he theory of
23
neutral principles thus loses almost all of its constraining force."'
Tushnet gives the interesting example of the principles to be derived
from Meyer v. Nebraska and Pierce v. Society of Sisters, as these appear in

light of the use to which they are put in Griswold v. Connecticut:
In one view Griswold tortures these precedents [Meyer and Pierce]
....Yet one can say with equal force that Griswold identifies for us the
true privacy principle of Meyer and Pierce, in the way the abortion funding cases identify the true principle of Roe v. Wade ....

[T]he retrospec-

tive approach to neutral principles must recognize the extensive
creativity exercised by a judge when he or she imputes to a precedent
"the" principle
that justifies both the precedent and the judge's pres124
ent holding.
How true. Now why is this disturbing? Tushnet explains:
In a legal system with a relatively extensive body of precedent and welldeveloped techniques of legal reasoning, it will always be possible to
show how today's decision is consistent with the relevant past ones, but
conversely, it will also always be possible to show how today's decision
is inconsistent with the precedents. This12symmetry,
of course, drains
"consistency" of any normative content. 5
In other words, the availability of choice drains doctrinal ideology of
its justification as the sole appropriate modality; the ideology's normative, or justifying, claim requires determinacy. But consider whether
such a charge is also effective against doctrinal argument as a legitimating modality. "Today's decision" is the product of thinking in the ways
of doctrinal argument as surely as precedent it distinguishes. We have
the scrivener's phrase "on all fours with" simply to demark those cases
that can't legitimately be decided doctrinally on any basis other than
one determined by a single precedent. A lawyer who concludes that a
122. P. 49.

123. Id
124. P. 50; compare P. BoBBrrr, supra note 3, at 239-40:
The present does in part control the past. Justice Douglas' use in Griswold of the
Meyer case as a First Amendment precedent might strike a law review editor as unprincipled; the First Amendment, after all, is not even cited in Meyer. But after such
use by the Court, Meyer becomes a First Amendment precedent and indeed may now
be seen as the decisive first step in the development of a First Amendment doctrine
of freedom of ideas. The present use of precedent transforms it, and the earlier case
must then be read in light of the use to which it is later put.
125. P. 51. For example, Tushnet notes that "Perry rejects as 'deeply flawed' and 'fundamentally confused' the position taken by the Court in the [abortion] funding cases and

repeated by Peter Westen." P. 48. I am inclined to conclude that Westen's position that Roe
barred the government from criminalizing abortions only because criminal sanctions impose
an undue burden on the woman's interest in deciding not to carry to term is analytically the
better of the two. But in any event, even if one could read the Roe precedent to support either
of two future holdings regarding funding, this does not mean that it is unprincipled.
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lack of complete determinacy leaves open any conceivable rationale has
very little imagination as to what is possible, even if implausible. More
importantly, suppose producing doctrinally legitimate options, not
foreclosing all but one, infuses rather than "drains" this approach of its
12 6
normative content precisely because it requires moral choice?
It's not just that Tushnet seems determined to enforce a prudentialist perspective on his description of doctrinalism; it's also that he seems
insensitive to what doctrinalism consists of. This is how he criticizes
one of the era's great doctrinal failures, Roe v. Wade:
When his opinion reached [the crucial issue of the "protected interest"], Justice Blackmun simply listed a number of cases ....This may

well fail to satisfy the current requirements of the craft [of doctrinal
argument].... [W]e can conclude that Justice Blackmun is a terrible
judge [because the same commentators who criticize the argument in
Roe accept the argument in Griswold.]
....
[I]f Griswold is acceptable we need only repeat its method in
12 7
Roe.

Suppose, however, that the argument in Griswold was unavailable to
Justice Blackmun. Justice Douglas's rationale in Griswold was a prudential argument-that the explicit guarantees of privacy in the Bill of
Rights could not be protected, as a practical matter, if the same judges
who were expected to protect people's homes from unreasonable
searches and seizures, ensure freedom of association, and prohibit the
occupation of houses by government troops were also required to permit the monitoring of the bedrooms of married couples to check for the
use of contraceptives. 128 Whatever one may think of this argument, it
was not one that Justice Blackmun could have made in Roe. Abortions
are not performed in the bedroom. Prudential arguments like Douglas's depend on such facts; when they are not available, the argument
129
cannot simply be "repeated."
Similarly, Tushnet faults doctrinalism for its reliance on craft. Noting Dworkin's recent analogy13 0 to common law decisionmaking, "that
126. P. BoBBrrr, supra note 78.
127. P. 53.
128. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965).
129. This hardly means that there were not other avenues available to the Court to support the decision; nor does that mean that Justice Blackmun is a "terrible judge" simply because he, along with the rest of the Court and virtually all of the academic community, failed
to look beyond the doctrinal mode in searching for such rationales.
130. Tushnet writes, pursuing the analogy of the novel to judicial craft:
Craft limitations make sense only if we agree on what the craft is. But consider the
craft of "writing novels." Its practice includes Trollope.. .Joyce ...Mailer.... We
might think ofJustice Blackmun's opinion in Roe as an innovation akin to Joyce's or
Mailer's. It is the totally unreasoned judicial opinion. To say that it does not look
like Justice Powell's decision in some other case is like saying that a Cubist "portrait"
does not portray its subject in the manner that a member of the academy would paint
it. The observation is true but irrelevant to the enterprise in which the artist orjudge
was engaged and to our ultimate assessment of his or her product.
P. 54. This is an important remark because Cubism, here, is analogous to another modality.
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a person asked to add one chapter 'in the best possible way' to a collaborative novel-in-progress faces limits similar to those that precedents
place on judges," Tushnet says that Dworkin "fails to appreciate that,
by disrupting our expectations about what fits best, the creative author
may force us both to reinterpret all that has gone before and to expand
' a
our understanding of what a 'novel' is. 1 '
Tushnet rightly concludes that the judicial craft breaks continuity,
and he clearly has a break of a radical sort in mind, as when Joyce and
Woolf took the novel inward. But the doctrinalist does not insist that
results be dictated by precedent or argue that craft is merely a certain
fluency. Rather, that craft-the art of choosing-is what makes the
opinion law.
If it is only a consequence of the pressures exerted by a highly developed, deeply entrenched, homeostatic social structure that judges
seem to eschew conclusions grossly at odds with the values of liberal
capitalism, sociological analysis ought to destroy the attraction of the
theory. Principles are "neutral" only in the sense that they are, as a
matter of contingent fact,
unchallenged, and the contingencies have
13 2
obvious historical limits.
But such jargon would shatter the faith only of a very naive believer-perhaps one who demanded determinacy and was credulous
enough to be persuaded that "sociological analysis" might supply it if
reliance on precedent did not. In fact, principles are neutral, for purposes of doctrinal argument, to the extent that they are neutral as to
13 3
the parties; that they are therefore contingent is a matter of course.
What it means to be principled could be different, but then the world
would be different. This modality could be different, but then we
would be different. That we could have been otherwise than we are is
of course true; but it is not so true as the fact that we are not.
V.

TEXTUAL ARGUMENT

By seeing the Constitution as a form of politics only, Tushnet loses
the ability to appreciate the constitutional sources of the modes of argument; instead, the modalities of argument are, for him, merely instrumentally derivative of various political purposes or agenda.
In the next section, Tushnet addresses textualism, which he calls
"the contention that some provisions of the Constitution need not be
interpreted but need only be applied, because they are entirely
But the "unreasoned opinion" is simply not law-as we now know it in our culture-because
the current modalities are ways of assessing arguments and there is no argument in an unreasoned opinion. The analogy would be perhaps the "subjectless portrait."

131. P. 54 n.104.
132. P. 57.
133. Jan G. Deutsch, Neutrality, Legitimacy, and the Supreme Court: Some Intersections Between
Law and Political Science, 20 STAN. L. REv. 169 (1968).
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clear."' 13 4 What follows is an explication of neither textual argument
nor "textualism," a mode that prudentialists always find particularly
hard to take seriously. Instead, Tushnet gives us a list of replies to the
unstated query of how textual argument can possibly be made ("because the meaning of the text itself is directly available to courts without interpreting it, or because the text itself excludes enough possible
interpretations"13 5 ). Yet the textualist would say that the provisions of
the Constitution simpliciter need not be interpreted according to any external referent (the intentions of the framers, the practicality of the outcome, etc.) "because" the Constitution does not say to do so, rather
than because the texts are especially clear, exclusionary, etc. That is
why textual argument, like the other modalities, is circular and cannot
justify itself. It is no answer to the question "Why do you conform to
the Constitution as it reads?" to reply "Because that is how the Constitution reads." Thejustification-the ideology-that lies behind the jurisprudence of textual argument is that of the social contract. The
words of the constitutional text represent an implicit contract, to which
the People, every day, give their implicit consent. Were its terms interpreted according to any recondite algorithm, that implicit assent could
not be inferred. Neither methodology nor ideology can claim authority
"because" the text is clear, excludes dangerous interpretations, or so
forth.
This is the briefest of Tushnet's treatments of the forms of argument, and the least careful. Again there are some confusions about the
distinctions among the modes, a recasting of the description in prudential terms, a failure to distinguish between method and ideology, and
the pattern of attack that we have hitherto seen, and will see again in
Tushnet's treatments of structural and ethical argument.' 3 6 But the
treatment is so cursory as to suggest that Tushnet finds it hard to believe that textual approaches are genuinely held.
He begins: "Tiextualism suffers from the same flaws that the attacks on originalism have exposed ' ' 1S7 and proceeds along the same
pattern. He is again insensitive to modal conflicts and distinctions,
however, and thus mixes originalist and textualist modes. For example,
he writes:
134. P. 60.

135. Id.
136. This pattern is as follows: 1) The form of argument is stated in prudential terms,

eliminating the grounding of the form in internal constitutional terms (for example, structural
approaches are good for the country because they protect diversity and thus avoid civil
strife);
2) a "theory" is concocted that purports to explain the particular features of the form (for
example, a theory of democracy requires the protection of diversity); 3) the theory is shown to
be unjustified since the practical premises by which it linked the form of argument to the
theory-the use of structural approaches really will protect diversity - are shown to be false
because in light of contemporary claims in the social sciences and political philosophy it can
be established that the approach is indeterminate and thus will not necessarily lead to the
result by which it is justified.
137. P. 60.

May 1989]

IS LAW POLITICS?

1263

In such an unsophisticated form, textualism is obviously vulnerable in
several respects. First, Frank Easterbrook has noted that the mathematical provisions, like all the others, have "reasons, goals, values, and
the like," behind them.... In this view the words "thirty-five Years" in
the Constitution are simply the shorthand the framers used to express
their more complex policies, and we could replace them by fifty years
or thirty years
without impairing the integrity of the constitutional
38
structure.'
This confuses the intent of a provision with its expression in the text. If
by "thirty-five years" the framers sought a provision that would insure a
certain maturity and experience in the persons who held the office of
president, the argumentative resort to this observation-in defense of
the eligibility, for example, of an especially experienced thirty-yearold-is a resort to historical argument. A different sort of error is evident in this description of an alleged textual approach: Why isn't a
sixteen-year-old guru, whose followers believe in reincarnation, eligible
for the presidency? For "if the President of the Senate had rejected
their definition of 'age' she would have established a particular religious view about the definition of age and violated their rights under
the free exercise clause, as well as their right grounded in democratic
theory to choose who will govern them."' 39 This is a tortured attempt
to give an example of how texts compete in the Constitution, and thus
show that a textual approach cannot be determinative. A more correct
(and more amusing) example, is given by Justice Black in his parody of
similar arguments by Justice Frankfurter, whom he calls "Judge X":
This case presents an important question of constitutional law. The
United States is engaged in a stupendous national defense undertaking
which requires the acquisition of much valuable land throughout the
country. The plaintiff here owns 500 acres of land. The location of the
land gives it a peculiarly strategic value for carrying out the defense
program. Due to the great national emergency that exists, Congress
concluded that the United States could not afford at this time to pay
compensation for the lands which it needed to acquire. For this reason
an act was passed authorizing seizure without compensation of all the
lands required for the defense establishment.
Plaintiff contends, however, that the Fifth Amendment's provision
about compensation is so absolute a command that Congress is wholly
without authority to violate it, however great the nation's emergency
and peril may be .... When two great constitutional provisions like
these conflict-here the power to make war conflicts with the requirements for just compensation-it becomes the duty of courts to weigh
the constitutional right of an individual to compensation against the
power of Congress to wage a successful war. 140
138. P. 61.
139. P. 62 (citing Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 547 (1969)).
140. Hugo L. Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U. L. REV. 865, 877-78 (1960). Yet
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Such indeterminacy leads Tushnet to conclude that "unsophisticated textualism... allows conservatives to agree that there are constitutional limits on legislative power that courts can enforce, thus
remaining within the liberal tradition, while vociferously denouncing
the courts for doing anything at all, because in our society the only
enforceable limits unsophisticated textualism acknowledges are not
about to be violated." 14 1 But is this so? The judicial career ofJustice
Black, and the contemporary criticism of his jurisprudence as far too
sweeping (that his simple textualism would invalidate not only all obscenity laws but conspiracy laws, antitrust combinations, etc., because
he took the phrase "Congress shall make no law" literally) suggests
14 2
otherwise.
Tushnet discusses several current forays into textual argument, but
it is clear his heart isn't in it.14 3 These analyses amount to a description

of one scholar's reading of a text, followed by Tushnet's own. 144 For
my own part, I often found neither reading compelling, but of what
importance is that? If we are not compelled to find a single answer,
then the presence of alternative constructions should not trouble us. In
the example Tushnet chooses-whether state sovereignty might enhance individual rights-he first replaces textualist standards with prudential ones, and then confuses the stricter demands of a modality's
ideological justification with those of argumentative legitimacy, the latter of which do not require a single determinate answer. There is a
reason for this behavior: Red, White, and Blue makes no distinction between ideology and argument, or between prudentialism and any other
modality, because for Tushnet it's all politics. Thus he ends this section by saying:
Textualism in all its forms suffers from a fatal defect. It gives us a Constitution with the politics left out. At some level, that is its point. But if
the Constitution is just another form of politics, the problem of social
order recurs. I close with some textualism of my own. The Constitution provides that the Senate "shall be composed of two Senators from

each State." For at least seven years, at least nine states had no Senators. How that came to be, and how the text of the Constitution came
to accommodate
that situation, tells us a great deal about
5
textualism.14

Tushnet is clearly aware of the relevance and importance of social context to textual argument: "The fragmentation of the linguistic community by political discord is central to those
circumstances." P. 62.
141. P. 63.
142. See generally Sidney Hook, A PhilosopherDissents in the Case ofAbsolutes, FREE SPEECH
AND PoLrrICAL PROTEST 77, 79 (Summers ed. 1967); Harry Kalven, Jr., Upon Rereading Mr.
Justice Black on the FirstAmendment, 14 UCLA L. REv. 428, 442-45 (1967).

143. Pp. 64-68.
144. Id. Compare Laycock's use of enumerated provisions to provide meaning of the
unenumerated, Douglas Laycock, Taking Constitutions Seriously: A Theory ofJudicial Review, 59

Tx. L. REv. 343, 371-73 (1981) with P. BoBBrrr, supra note 3, at 142-48.
145. Pp. 68-69. For two authors that do tell us a great deal about textualism, see the
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This is meant to be powerfully evocative, but amounts to no more
than an obtuse non sequitur. It does not tell us "a great deal" about
textual argument and the ideology of textualism, but it does tell us a lot
about Tushnet's project. Tushnet's observation shows that a sufficiently extreme political emergency-and for a constitution, a civil war
must be the supreme crisis-will override even the clearest text. But if,
in an emergency, facts override law, doesn't our awareness of this suggest that we know that something, something of importance, has been
overridden?
VI.

STRUCTURAL ARGUMENT

Many of the constituent flaws in Tushnet's approach converge in his
discussion of structural argument: the inability to account for modal
recurrence among constitutional lawyers across several generations,
the carelessness regarding modal distinctions, and the confusion between arguments and ideology. The model he chooses to analyze, as
an example of structural argument, is John Hart Ely's important contribution: the notion of "representation-reinforcing review." "Ely argues
that this theory provides the only justification for judicial review. It appears to be a perfect reconciliation of judicial review with the
14 6
majoritarian aspects of democracy."'
Tushnet is surely right in noticing that here, as elsewhere, each of
the various approaches suggests a particular sort of rationale for judicial review and a particular sort of reply to the countermajoritarian objection. But such rationales are not in themselves a "theory of the
constitution," rather they follow from one. Beginning with this fragment, Tushnet attempts to enlarge Ely's structural rationale forjudicial
review into the entire structural approach, and accordingly misses its
point. He makes this elemental mistake, I think, because he is tonedeaf to the harmony between Ely and his great structuralist predecessors, ChiefJustice John Marshall and Charles Black. And how could he
see these connections, after all, when he has recast structural argument,
including Ely's contribution, in prudential terms? Tushnet takes structural argument to be "the jurisprudence of democracy" and gets tangled up in a rather oversimple civics-class model of democracy as the
basis for Ely's argument, when in fact Ely's "democracy" (like Black's
and Marshall's) is not a political scientist's ideal, but rather a legal ideal
specified by the Constitution; indeed, that is why Ely's theory is worth
understanding as within a constitutionalapproach at all. Disappointed
with his construction of Ely's purpose, Tushnet still cannot resist restating it in prudential terms: "The theory of representation reinforceestimable Hans Linde's rightly influential Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 NEB. L. REv. 197
(1976); Frederick Schauer, Easy Cases, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 399 (1985); Frederick Schauer, The
Constitution as Text and Rule, 29 WM. & MARY L. REv. 41 (1987).
146. P. 71.
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ment need not, however, find its sole justification in a narrow
conception of democracy. It might be justified by the judgment that it
is the best theory available 7to limit legislators enough without licensing
14
judges to do too much."
As with the other modal approaches, Tushnet ignores the basis that
each theory would claim for itself, namely that some feature of the Constitution mandates it, in the legal sense of that term; and that this is why
it provides a satisfactory rationale for judicial review. Instead, seeing
each as no more than a policy proposal, Tushnet offers a prudential
reason-the constraint ofjudicial discretion-from which he can derive
the test of whether or not the particular form of argument adequately
does this. Yet each approach fails him.
It should now be clear why on this treatment each of the five other
approaches must fail. Legitimacy is maintained by following the forms
of argument; these forms do not claim to justify themselves. Much earlier scholarly work that pressed such claims was circular for just that
reason. But they are not delegitimated because they are discrete, because one form does not follow the rules of another. It is an irrelevance, as regards legitimacy, to measure a structural argument, for
example, by the standards of a doctrinal argument. Both a majority
opinion and a dissent can be legitimate (though both can't be right).
Justification, on the other hand, is sought by the ideologies that derive
from these forms. Each claims that it is the one true way, owing to a
legal theory of power. The ratifiers had the power to endow the government with limited sovereignty; therefore their intentions in so doing
must be followed if that sovereignty is to be legally justified. And so
148
on, for each of the six forms.
By recasting each form as justifiable only on prudential grounds,
Tushnet not only does violence to the modalities, he "fixes" the argument so that it must fail. For if it were to claim justification on those
grounds, it would have abandoned its distinctive form as well as the
legal claim by which it maintains legitimacy. Legal theories are claims
for authority, not simply appeals to the normative demands of political
scientists. They are thus neither normative-in the sense of an appeal
outside the system-nor descriptive. If I say the prevailing authority or
precedent requires a certain outcome or range of outcomes, I am not
saying that that is the outcome I prefer on policy or philosophical
grounds, nor am I predicting a certain result, for even if I knew the
judge had been corrupted and would rule otherwise, I would still make
the same statement. Law is not politics, but neither is it political
science.
With this introduction, let us look at Tushnet's depiction of the
structural approach to interpreting the Constitution. Adopting Ely's
147. Id
148. See P. BoBBrrT, supra note 78.
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terminology for the structural rationale for judicial review, he calls the
structural approach "representation-reinforcing review": 149
The situation with representation-reinforcing review is similar [to
that of originalism]: the affirmative arguments for it rest on a narrow
and probably indefensible conception of democracy, but it might be a
decent theory if it constrains both legislators and judges enough for us
to be satisfied that the remaining opportunities for tyranny are small
and does so better than any alternatives....
Although the theory has been given the name representation-reinforcing review only recently, its historical antecedents go back to ChiefJusticeJohn Marshall,
who sketched the theory in a number of important
150
federalism cases.
It is certainly true that Marshall was our greatest structuralist judge;
his arguments in the early federalism and commerce clause cases provide the classic examples of structural argument. But here notation
matters: Marshall never sketched a representation-reinforcing theory
of judicial review, and indeed held, as we know from Marbury, a completely different view of the rationale for judicial review. The difficulty
is that, having taken representation-reinforcing review as a paradigm
for structural argument generally, Tushnet must somehow link it up
with Marshall's approach. This error is greatly compounded when
Tushnet takes Justice Stone's celebrated footnote to CaroleneProducts-a
note that does have something to do with representation, but nothing to
do with the structural approach-as a typical, indeed fundamental, element in that approach. He writes, the "theory was developed further
by Harlan Fiske Stone in the 1930s and the 1940s."''1
It is not easy to see how mistakes of agglomeration are made be149. This is like calling Marxism "the labor theory of value" or Gothic architecture the
"flying buttress." It can generate some misunderstandings, not the least of which are the
incongruities that arise when this theory is grafted onto those of other structuralists with different rationales for judicial review or other legal thinkers who share some elements of the rationale but not the general approach.
150. P. 72. This provides an example of why the notation "structural argument" is to be
preferred to the phrase "jurisprudence of democracy": Not only is the latter somewhat misleading as to Ely's views, since the democratic structures he is concerned with reinforcing are
those specified by the Constitution and not simply those that are democratic per se; it is also
deeply misleading as to the antecedents of Ely's structuralism. Thus Tushnet proceeds to
introduce a number of important early structural cases arising out of federalism, a concept
that has very little to do with democracy per se, but everything to do with the structures of
American constitutional democracy.
151. P. 1 n.1. Justice Stone suggested, in his famous adumbration to the Carolene Products case, a distinction between the degrees of scrutiny appropriate to cases in which the electoral process was ill-suited to correct abuse, and other cases in which this defect was not
present. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). Justice Stone, a
thorough-going and committed prudentialist, did not use structural argument to make his
point. Indeed, the entire purpose of the footnote is to mark the appropriate lines for judicial
intervention and thus shares much with Justice Brandeis' Ashwander concurrence, Ashwander
v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 341 (1936), and Bickel's "Passive Virtues," Alexander M. Bickel, Foreword- The Passive Virtues, 75 HARv.L. REv. 40 (1961), other classic statements in the prudentialist canon. For a later generation's development of this tradition, see Bruce Ackerman, Beyond
Carolene Products, 98 HARv. L. REv. 713 (1985). Characteristically, the footnote does not
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cause they come to us in the agglomerated state. It is difficult to untangle the strands that have been melted together. But this, I think, is
what has happened here: Tushnet correctly perceives Ely's rationale
for judicial review as "structural," but erroneously takes it as dictating
the approach generally (reversing the direction of entailment, as it
were). Tushnet then confronts Marshall, whom he correctly perceives
as a structuralist but who did not share Ely's views as to the basis for
judicial review, and Stone, who shared Ely's rationale forjudicial review
but was no structuralist. This initial error blinds Tushnet to the differences among these figures, and so he arrives at an "Ely-Marshall-Stone
approach."
What does it matter if the terms are used a little differently, or if
great judges are classified somewhat differently? What is the importance of notation when discussing the modalities of constitutional interpretation? 152 Consider this description by Tushnet of "the theory"
reduced to "representation-reinforcing review" with its larger structural approach ignored:
Two relatively uncontroversial cases clarify the application and defects
of the theory in other, more interesting and controversial cases. The
first example involves "states' rights." Can the courts ever properly
overturn national legislation on the ground that it infringes on the constitutionally recognized interests of states? Here the theory, at least as
presented by most of its adherents, says no. Because the interests of
the states are expressed in a completely open and unobstructed way in
the national political process, the courts cannot overturn1 5 on
states'
3
rights grounds legislation that emerges from that process.
This reduces structural arguments to the representation-reinforcing
element alone. Yet that element was included in the first place only
because the constitutional structure demanded it, not because it had
any independent status of its own-not, that is, because it appeared in a
footnote to a Supreme Court opinion (and thus was required by adherence to precedent), and not because it restrained judges (and thus
served a prudential goal). In fact, structural arguments would be the
first, as Marshall and Charles Black argued, to protect the states on the
grounds that the constitutional structure demands it. Offering no apparent idea as to the constitutional source of the notion of representation-reinforcing review, Tushnet does not, of course, connect the
specify a substantive rule as to what standard should be applied, only a checklist as to when an
intervention to review the legislature is appropriate.
152. Tushnet is not reluctant to accuse others of closet prudentialism, charges they must
find particularly galling since he so widely misses their point of view. Thus, he says:
I have developed the theory [structural argument] in what I regard as its most defensible form. Most of its adherents appear to resist some of the conclusions I draw, by
relaxing some of the premises in an ad hoc manner, for what seem to me to be
straightforward political reasons: without the ad hoc adaptations the theory yields
results that those adherents find politically unacceptable.
P. 72.
153. Id
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structural form of argument with anything that would protect constitutional structures (as distinct from "democracy").
Tushnet continues with a discussion of interstate commerce:
Under what circumstances may the courts prevent states or localities
from regulating commercial activity that has its origins or impact in
other states? Here the theory appears to support a fair degree ofjudiwho are affected are said to
cial intervention, because the outsiders
54
have no role in the local legislature.'
Tushnet has the structural nature of this argument right: Court review
is invoked, in the classic cases that develop this theory, to protect the
structure of national economic union against the centrifugal forces of
the state legislatures.
But this should have alerted him to the fact that more than representation-reinforcing review is going on in those cases, for representation-reinforcing review does not lead to such holdings. Indeed, in
those cases in which Tushnet finds "formal" barriers to representation
(e.g., an unrepresented external constituency), structural holdings are
not the consequence of a desire to enhance representation at all. Thus,
in McCulloch, the Maryland legislature was forbidden to tax a federal
instrumentality not simply because its interests were not formally voted
in state elections (such a holding would prohibit taxing corporations,
for example) but because a tax on a federal enterprise extends to the
entire national polity, which is necessarily unrepresented in the state legislatures according to the federal structure of the Constitution. 155 That
is why the state power to tax federal operations at any level of taxation,
no matter how modest, is inconsistent with the constitutional scheme,
while the federal power to tax state operations depends on its actual
impact.
These cases have nothing to do with the enhancement of representation that we are concerned about when civil liberties are jeopardized
or minorities are stigmatized, and thus they do not provide much basis
for protection in such circumstances. They are just not relevant,
although the arguments in these classic cases fall within the genre of
structural argument. By making what might appear to have been no
more than a mistake in notation, Tushnet subsumes these cases within
representation-reinforcing review and demands that they provide the
basis for intervention when civil liberties and civil rights are threatened.
Finding their reliance on formal relationships insufficient to do this job,
he then proposes to correct them by having judges review legislative
processes for their democratic and representative perfection; and then
excoriates the "theory" he has reconstructed as one that fails to constrain judicial discretion, and thus, fails his test for legitimacy and
justification:
154. Id.
155. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
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The defect in the theory ... is that representation-reinforcing review must consider whether formal or informal obstacles in the political process are to be removed. If the theory focuses on formal
obstacles alone, it is subject to serious criticism, for removing the formal obstacles would do little to alleviate the risk of tyranny. Yet if the
theory takes informal obstacles into account, judges will be called upon
to make controversial assessments of political reality and the theory
loses its constraining force. Thus the theory designed to prevent both
legislative and judicial tyranny, can prevent one only by creating the
156
risk of the other.
But the theory was "designed" to do no such thing; in fact, it was not
designed at all. Moreover, this is not the "theory," if by that Tushnet
means the theory of representation-reinforcing review, that unites Ely
and Marshall.
Tushnet nonetheless continues in this vein: "The Supreme Court
1 57
discussed this theory in the important early case of Gibbons v. Ogden.'
But of course Marshall does no such thing. He never discusses representation-reinforcing review, and he never defends his approach on the
grounds that he is attempting to prevent judicial tyranny. Tushnet is
led into such an obviously wrong claim because there is a link-structural argument. But Tushnet fails to recognize precisely what it is that
links Marshall and Ely, or for that matter what he himself is doing, because he is unsure of the nature and distinctions of the modalities.
Thus, Tushnet quotes Marshall's reply to Ogden:
"The wisdom and the discretion of Congress, their identity with the
people, and the influence which their constituents possess at elections
are, in this, as in many other instances, as that, for example, of declaring war, the sole restraints on which they have relied, to secure them
from its abuse. They are the restraints on which the people must often
rely solely, in all representative governments." . . . Jesse Choper has
exhaustively elaborated this representation-reinforcing
analysis of con58
gressional power and states' rights.'
Marshall's argument, however, beyond using the word "representative," is certainly not a representation-reinforcement argument. He is
not arguing about the legislative process, as Wechsler does, 159 but
about the nature of the power over commerce; that is why the war
power is mentioned. Marshall's point is that a plenary power, in contrast to a restricted power, is one whose objects the Congress alone
must define constitutionally. His remarks about the wisdom and discretion of Congress are meant to underscore the common sense of such a
156. P. 72-73.

157. Id.
158. Id. Tushnet goes on to cite Wechsler's celebrated argument that Congress' constituent base makes it the appropriate check on federal encroachment on the states. Id. (citing
Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism, in PRINCIPLES, PoLrncs, AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW 49 (1961)).
159. Wechsler, supra note 158, at 49.
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constitutional allocation; they are emphatically not its rationale, 160 as a
less artful excerpting would disclose. 16 ' Finally, if Tushnet was right
about Marshall's views, then Marshall assuredly would not permit
court-imposed limits on any of the enumerated federal powers vis-a-vis
the states, nor would he use the judicial instrument to enforce limits on
non-plenary powers. There is, however, ample evidence to the contrary in Marshall's opinions.
Wechsler's argument is different, it being like Choper's 162 that the
states are protected by the legislative and electoral process, but neither
is an argument derived from the representation-reinforcement basis for
judicial review. That is, neither suggests that the reason we ought to
rely on the Congress, and not the courts, to police the boundaries of
federal power is because the constituency basis for federal elections will
make members of Congress more sensitive to the Constitution when it
concerns federalism than when it concerns civil liberties or the protection of minorities. There is such an argument to be made, of course; it
is usually made, as are practical, fact-centered constitutional arguments, from a prudential perspective. Having recast the "formal"
structural cases like McCulloch and Gibbons as representation-reinforcing
cases, and then limited structural argument to its representation-reinforcing aspect, Tushnet concludes: "If representation-reinforcement
review is justified only where formal mechanisms of representation are
163
absent .... Congress will tyrannize over the states."'

Why is it important to keep straight whether Choper or Wechsler or
Marshall is making structural arguments? After all, isn't the persuasiveness of the argument, and not its rhetorical characterization, the point?
Take the conclusion just stated, that if judicial review were limited to
cases where the formal mechanisms of federalism and representative
government had broken down, Congress would tyrannize the states,
because in the real world states are not really protected by their representatives in Congress no matter what the formal relation may be.
Tushnet wrenches an argument from Choper to serve as the straw man
for this conclusion:
Choper mentions bipartisan caucuses of House delegations from each
state, the political positions such as Governor held by members of
Congress before their election to Congress, the deep personal ties
members have to their localities, and the importance of "state political
chieftains" 164
in generating support for those who would seek the
presidency.

160. Marbury would be wholly undercut by such a rationale; in fact Bickel attempted to
do so by precisely this means. See A. BICKEL, supra note 14, at 1-14.
161. See, e.g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 196-97 (1824).
162. SeeJesse H. Choper, The Scope of NationalPower Vis d Vis the States: The Dispensabilityof
Judicial Review, 86 YALE LJ. 1552 (1977).

163. P. 74.
164. Ia
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Tushnet then proceeds to discredit this claim by observing that "[t]here
are serious difficulties in relying on this kind of evidence .... For each
item on which he [Choper] relies one can find another that substantially
weakens the point ....

The difficulty is that those who live by empirical

65
research die by empirical research as well."'
But Choper is not defending the dubious structural thesis Tushnet
attributes to Marshall and Ely; he is in fact replying to a structural argument, which would insist on judicial review to protect the states, 166 with
a fact-centered prudential argument of his own, 16 7 one which Tushnet
simply doubts on a factual basis. Keeping the modalities straight would
have cleared up this tangle and perhaps thrown into high relief the absurdity of the structural caricature. But that caricature appears to have
been necessary to allow Tushnet to repeat the move made with the earlier modes discussed. Tushnet again concludes that the failure to
achieve the theory's ideological goal (here the preservation of the structure of government) means that judges must cheat on the prescribed
method of rationalizing (the mode of structural reasoning), and this
cheating frees the judge from the constraints of the method, thus establishing the failure to achieve the principal policy goal set for each modality by the author, that of restricting the power of the judiciary: "If
representation consists in formal mechanisms, the theory appears to be
inadequate to guard against tyranny by a congressional majority; but if
representation occurs through informal mechanisms as well, the theory
loses its force as a guard against tyranny by the judiciary."' 68 But to
achieve such symmetry requires Tushnet to exercise main force on
structural argument. This is particularly evident in his astonishing
treatment of the principal American case in the structural mode, Chief
Justice Marshall's opinion in McCulloch. Tushnet writes:
Our second example of the theory's operation is also drawn from
federalism, here the question of the courts' power to declare state legislation unconstitutional on the grounds that the legislation interferes
with interstate commerce.
...

John Marshall again showed the way. McCulloch v. Marylandin-

volved a tax that Maryland imposed on 69
the activities of banks that were
not chartered by the state legislature.'
But of course, as every first year law student knows, McCulloch is not
an interstate commerce case. The whole point of its being a structural
case is that in Part II of the opinion, which strikes down the Maryland
statute, Marshall carefully avoids citing any affirmative federal power.
165. Pp. 74-75.
166. See, e.g., CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., PERSPECTIVES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 30-31
(1963); see also National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (Rehnquist,J.); Garcia

v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 579-80 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
167. JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL PoLrrCAL PROCESS: A FUNCTIONAL RECONSIDERATION OF THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT 176-93 (1980).
168. P. 75.
169. P. 76.
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How could Tushnet make such a blunder? Because the framework he
has painstakingly set up requires it. He needs a structural case that will
link up representation-reinforcing review with the supremacy of Congress's commerce power. He purports to find one in McCulloch which
does rely on theories of representation, and another in a genetically
altered Gibbons v. Ogden (which does rely on the supremacy of the commerce power). Taken together, he will use these to show that structural
argument (thus portrayed) yields an unavoidable but absurd conclusion: The supremacy of Congress and its real-world sensitivity to state
interests not only give it the power, but give it the exclusive power, to
police the boundaries of federal authority; the sole exception is those
instances in which Congressional representation has broken down (because it is the representational nature of Congress that makes it both
empowered to correct their abuses, since it is hierarchically superior,
and institutionally suited to do so). Representation breaks down in the
face of "legislation which restricts those political processes which can
ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation
• . . [or] prejudice against discrete and insular minorities .

.

. which

tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities." 170 Thus are Stone and
Choper linked to Ely, and all to Marshall. It is a travesty. By such tacking together we get this result (and the claim that the result is the product of inexorable logic): The structural approach would necessarily
permit any legislative body (excluding Congress) to put any restrictions
whatsoever on its constituency's franchise, and (including Congress) to
forbid public discussion of any subject whatsoever (excepting only the
discussion of the proscribing statute). A city council could limit appearances before it to members of a particular political party, a state
legislature could reintroduce the all-white primary, and Congress could
ban public debate (and public meetings) even on these events without
any court being able to legitimately intervene. To these absurd results,
Tushnet only replies: Well, it's your theory.
But is it? To make it a "theory" at all, Tushnet must deal pretty
creatively with its constituent elements. Having characterized McCulloch as a commerce clause case, Tushnet now must somehow deal with
the structural argument that Marshall introduces to deny Maryland's
authority to tax a federal instrumentality. Hitherto this has been
thought to be a paradigm of structural argument in that it-like
Chadha171 in our own day-does not inquire into the real-world impact
of the offensive regulation, but requires instead a strict adherence to
the constitutional structure. Notice how Tushnet assimilates the structural federalism rationale into a prudential commerce clause problem:
"Maryland treated out-of-state banks differently from the way it treated
170. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
171. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
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in-state banks, but banks do not vote anyway.... If we are to save the
theory [yet prevent discrimination against commerce] we must now introduce informal mechanisms of representation [which show that instate banks have a real-world influence in the legislature]."' 1 72
But of course Marshall's argument does not even address the issue
of taxing the bank as such. It is Maryland's taxation of federal taxpayers, not "out-of-state" banks, that was the problem; it was not necessary
to show then that in-state taxpayers were "informally" represented.
This rationale would not have helped Tushnet, however, who needs a
different McCulloch. His McCulloch is Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Commission,' 7 3 authored neither by Marshall nor Stone, whom
he quotes as a summation of the concocted McCulloch argument:
"When the regulation is of such a character that its burden falls principally upon those without the state, legislative action is not likely to be
subjected to those political restraints which are normally exerted on
legislation where it affects adversely some interests within the state."' 74
This is a quite different point from McCulloch's: not that the legislature lacks authority, as in McCulloch, but that it lacks restraint. It is a
prudential rather than a structural argument. Indeed, McCulloch is not
even cited by the Court in Hunt (or in South CarolinaHighway Department
v. Barnwell Bros. either, from which the quoted passage is taken).' 75 Yet
Tushnet concludes that "[s]ince McCulloch and Gibbons it has been clear
that Congress has power to regulate [a state's restriction on interstate
1 76
commerce] in whatever way it wants."
The principal burden of this chapter in Red, White, and Blue is to set
up a "hierarchical" argument for which McCulloch and Gibbons are to
provide the links to Marshall. This argument holds that: 1) If structural approaches are limited to those instances in which there has been
a failure of adequate representation, and 2) the Congress may preempt
state legislatures in every respect, then 3) whenever Congress's representation is adequate-as judged by the Carolene Products standardstructural approaches will be unavailing to courts trying to review state
practices for their constitutionality. Tushnet puts it this way:
In the United States legislatures are arranged in a hierarchy: a superior
legislature may override decisions made at a lower level. According to
the version of the theory being considered here, courts must ignore an
obstacle to representation in a subordinate legislature if representation
in a superior legislature is unobstructed. In our system that means the
representation-reinforcing review is appropriate only with respect to
obstacles to representation in Congress, for, as we will see, Congress is
172. P. 77.
173. 432 U.S. 333 (1977).
174. P. 77 (quoting South Carolina Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 184
n.2 (1938)).
175. Does this sort of thing prove, or discredit, Tushnet's claim that any precedent, in
the hands of a clever lawyer, can be characterized in any way?
176. P. 77.
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the superior legislature not just with respect to regulation of commerce
17 7
but with respect to the entire range of civil rights and civil liberties.
Whatever one may think of this argument-and the allocation ofjurisdiction to the federal courts by Congress would appear to render it
vacuous on its own terms-it at least appears to be a structural argument. That is, it appears to depend on inferences derived from the
relationships among those structures set up by the Constitution: specifically, federal supremacy (the relation) and representative federalism
(the structure). Actually, however, the argument turns out to be a prudential recasting of structural arguments. Having rendered the judicial
use of structural approaches impotent by the argument from hierarchy,
Tushnet would save them through real-world assessments of precisely
how well represented various interests are, only to profess horror at the
introduction of judicial action that is axiomatically representation-denying insofar as it overturns the decisions of (formally) representative
bodies.178
Consider, for example, his treatment of the negative commerce
clause cases. The usual structural rationale for these cases is that the
allocation to a national Congress of the commerce power sets up the
structure of a national economic union; that this allocation inferentially
denies to the states both the power to regulate interstate commerce per
se (as the states do not have a national franchise) and the power to discriminate against out-of-state commerce (since the prevention of balkanization was the other pillar of the allocation to Congress). Judicial
intervention is necessary to preserve the context of congressional action: the national economic market. The fact that Congress is hierarchically superior to the states as to this subject does not deny but
requiresjudicial oversight.
For Tushnet, however, structural argument means representationreinforcement, and that transforms all structural problems into assessments about the political process: "When one observes an outcome of
the political process, how can one be sure that it results from obstacles
to representation rather than from lack of sufficiently intense concern
on the part of those affected?"' 7 9 Thus, in the negative commerce
177. P. 78. Tushnet first quotes Justice Jackson's observation that Congress is too preoccupied to oversee the treatment of out-of-state interests by state legislatures and suggests
that this would allow us to slip the restraints of the hierarchical argument. He then concludes,
however, that "although judicial intervention appears at first blush to be representation reinforcing, on analysis it can seem representation denying, and the injection of political reality to
counter the formalism of the 'hierarchy argument' makes it impossible to treat out-of-state
interests as unrepresented in local legislatures." P. 79.
178. P. 78. In a later chapter, Tushnet dismisses the significance of article III's allocation of the jurisdiction of the federal courts to Congress. Waving aside arguments to the
contrary by Black and Perry, he writes: "What matters here, though, is not constitutional
theory but how politics operates. The scholarly consensus is a political force that keeps Congress from enacting jurisdiction-restricting legislation." P. 200. This conclusion illustrates
the pitfalls of academics who would comment on politics.
179. P. 80.
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clause cases,
the issue is one of allocating the associated burdens of inertia and lack
of intensity. Ideas about representation alone cannot specify the starting point or status quo allocation of those burdens. That, after all, is
why the commerce clause cases routinely invoke the fear of balkanization, a normative criterion unrelated to representation, to justify what
appears to be judicial displacement of local choices but what is actually
a judicial determination of the group upon whom the burdens of inertia and lack of intensity will rest.' 80
Of course it is true that the fear of balkanization is not connected to
representation-reinforcing review or representation; but instead of
concluding that it is therefore merely a front or pretext for making a
factual judgment that might allow a representation-reinforcing review
theory to decide such cases, one ought to have doubts as to whether

representation-reinforcing review is what is really going on there.
Tushnet is obliged to ignore this if he is going to focus on the contingent beneficiary of the commerce clause analysis-who ins-as the basis for the decision. He simply does not treat the claim that fear of
balkanization is the concern driving the analysis, l8 1 even though such a
link to the constitutional structure is indispensable for a structural approach. Indeed, I think the use of the very terms "inertia" and "intensity"-terms drawn from political science that Tushnet has used to
reconstruct the meaning of the negative commerce clause cases-would
come as a surprise to the authors of those opinions, whom we are assured are "actually" preoccupied with such matters.
Tushnet thinks that representation-reinforcing review is grounded
in an effort to enforce the democratic character of the political system;
on this basis he then decides, as a practical matter, that it isn't. If he
had appreciated the legal basis for structural argument, of which representation-reinforcing review is but an inference, the failure to adequately capture "intensity" and so forth would have seemed irrelevant.
Indeed, one doubts whether Tushnet can actually make a structural
argument; 8 2 see, for example, how he uses the following case to reveal
180. Id.
181. See id.
182. See p. 82. Perhaps it would be well here to review briefly a typical structural argument. They tend to be logically straightforward: First, an uncontroversial statement about a
constitutional structure is introduced; second, a relationship is inferred from this structure;
third, a factual assertion about the world is made. The holding rests on the deduction drawn.
For example, the argument in National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (which
was emphatically not a tenth amendment case), went essentially like this:
1. We have a federal system, composed of a supreme federal state and member states.
2. It follows that, to have such a system, there must be at least one thing that the national legislature cannot order the states to do; otherwise, we would not have a federal system
but would instead have replaced it with the regions and departments of a unitary system.
3. Determining the wages and hours of state employees is a function crucial to the preservation of a state as a state; if Congress could manipulate the costs of such items, it could
control state policies generally.
4. Therefore, Congress cannot be permitted to exercise such control.
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the flaws in structural approaches:
Kramer v. Union Free School DistrictNo. 15 illustrates the problems that the
existence of a hierarchy ofjurisdictions poses for representation-reinforcing review. [Kramer was an adult who lived with his parents and
was neither a renter nor a taxpayer. The Supreme Court overturned
the statute that prohibited his voting in school board elections, on the
grounds that it thereby disenfranchised many persons with a greater
interest in such elections than those it enfranchised.] ...This decision
appears to fit the theory of representation-reinforcing review: The
Court removed an obstacle to participation in the political process because that obstacle was not precisely
designed to advance state pur83
poses unrelated to participation.'
Note first that the "theory" elides the difference between Stone's
prudentialism and Ely's structuralism-that is, between a rationale for
when to defer to the legislature, having undertaken review, and the rationale for judicial reviewper se. Second, even on Stone's "theory," we
would merely require a closer look at the statute; it would not be the
justification for overturning the statute. The Carolene Products footnote
provides neither a justification for judicial review (in contrast to Ely's
theory) nor the substantive basis upon which to overturn a statute. Finally, does the case actually pose a problem for Ely's theory?
Tushnet writes:
But the problem of legislative hierarchy poses a serious difficulty ....
[A]Ithough Kramer could not vote in school district elections, he could
vote for state legislators who support the repeal of the local disfranchisement. If we consider only formal obstacles to representation,
the theory would not justify judicial review so long as the disenfranchised person can vote in elections for a legislature that can repeal
voter disqualification rules that it or subordinate legislatures have

imposed. 184
On this view of Ely's theory, it could never apply to any disenfranchisement except that barring voting for Congress since, according to section 5 of the fourteenth amendment, all legislatures are subordinate to
Congress on that issue. 18 5 If enhancing representation is the only justification for intervention, and if deference to the legislature must be afforded whenever the system of representation is not rigged or in rigor
mortis (and cannot cure itself-the Carolene Products points), then only
interventions that correct representational defects that the system cannot itself correct arejustified. Thus, Tushnet concludes from his analysis of Kramer that: 1) Structural theory requires a real-world assessment
of Kramer's access to, and likelihood of prevailing before, his hierarchically superior legislature; and therefore that 2) "now ... we are deep
into the details of political reality, which, as we have seen and will see
183. Pp. 83-84.
184. P. 84.
185. See id
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again, eliminates the theory's constraining force."' 8 6 Yet if we confine
ourselves to structural approaches without the benefit of such political
assessments, then we face this unhappy conclusion: "So long as the
complainant has access to such a legislature, his or her exclusion from
the vote for local bodies is unassailable within the theory."' 8 7 I imagine that no one who could possibly be classified as a structural advocate
could possibly hold such an absurd position. Only by confusing different modalities of argument can one be led, with seeming logical inexorability, to such an8 8impasse. As Descartes whispered in agony,
"Messieurs, epargnez.'
This was a consequence of confusing prudential and structural approaches.' 8 9 Let me give another, more dramatic example of the confusion of these two approaches. Tushnet evaluates how structural
approaches cope with the problem of guaranteeing free speech and
reaches this surprising conclusion: "The theory is then inadequate to
guard against legislative tyranny" because it "justiffies] invalidation of
national sedition statutes, and nothing else" and "such tyranny expresses itself in laws other than sedition statutes."'

90

This is the argument:
The theory requires that policy result from the aggregation of revealed
preferences. Disfranchisements prevent some people from using the
vote to reveal their preferences whatever they are. Limitations on
speech prevent people from revealing particularpreferences, those for
the policy about which speech is limited. For example, if a statute
makes it unlawful to advocate racial segregation, those who prefer segregation will be unable to reveal that desire. The conclusion that only
national laws can be attacked under the theory follows easily from the
analysis of disfranchisements. Local restrictions on speech can be remedied by state or national legislation that prevents local legislatures
186. P. 85. Tushnet sees the first half of this, that his reconstruction of the theory
proves too much. Thus, he writes: "Is Congress a hierarchically superior body over state
legislatures with respect to disenfranchisements? Both precedent and the theory say that
Congress is indeed superior." P. 86. "Within the theory then, challengers ought to be able to
attack only exclusions from the national franchise." Id.
187. P. 86.
188. JOHN P. MAHAFFY, DESCARTES 136 (1910).
189. Tushnet says that Lupu "argues that the allocation is justified by a substantive preference for an enlarged electorate; exclusions may distort the outcomes of local elections
before the state legislature can act. But the concept of distortion itself requires a prior specification that the preferences of people like Kramer ought to be taken into account. That is
precisely what is at stake, and although the judgment that those interests should be taken into
account is certainly defensible, it cannot be made on the grounds of representation alone." P.
85 n.29 (citing Ira Lupu, Choosing Heroes Carefully, 15 HAxv. G.R.-C.L. L. REV. 781, 797 n.62
(1980)).
This is a very acute observation and a valuable one. But notice what it tells us about the
observer. Both Tushnet and Lupu are classifying themselves as prudentialists when they assert that there is some external value-for Lupu, a "substantive preference of an enlarged
electorate"-against which the "allocation" must be measured, whereas for the structuralist
these choices have been made.
190. P. 89.
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19 1
from enacting such restrictions.

First, one must observe that the "theory" does not require "that
policy result from the aggregation of revealed preferences." That
would be a prudential theory, that is, one justifying a particular argument by its contribution to an external value (maximizing the satisfaction of revealed preferences). The structuralist may indeed hold such
assumptions. It may be that Madison thought that representation was a
good thing because it allowed the preferences of voters to be reflected
in government. But it is doubtful that Hamilton felt this way, and it is
unlikely that either would have weakened his commitment to parliamentary representation if it had been shown that some other system, of
opinion polls or councils of sociologists, for example, was a more effective means of translating revealed preferences into policy. The reason
why the structuralist is committed to the particular system of representation we have-so unique among the societies that we recognize as
"democratic" as to be almost idiosyncratic-is because the Constitution
specifies such a system.
Second, instead of beginning with an external preference-maximizing consumer satisfaction, say-begin instead with the structures
that the text provides: a national legislature constituted through elections, for example. Now contrast the following argument from Charles
Black with the quoted passage from Tushnet regarding the implications
of structural approaches for state restrictions on free speech:
Again, I make bold to assert, that from the very structure of the
relation between the national representative and his constituency,
there arises a compelling inference of some national constitutional protection of free utterance, as against state infringement. Is it conceivable that a state, entirely aside from the Fourteenth, or for that matter
the First Amendment, could permissibly forbid public discussion of the
merits of candidates for Congress, or of issues which have been raised
in the congressional campaign, or which an inhabitant of the districtor of the state, where the election is senatorial-might wish to see
raised in the campaign? I start with that as the hard core, because I
cannot see how anyone could think our national government could
run, or was by anybody at any time ever expected to run, on any less
openness of public communication than that.192
On a structural view, the "hierarchy of representation" leads to precisely the opposite of Tushnet's conclusion.
Finally, there is no warrant for the inference that courts should, on
representation-reinforcing grounds, desist from the review of state statutes. There appears to be one only if you confuse the prudential standard for judicial scrutiny with the substantive structural rationale for
judicial review. If the latter arises from the constitutional structures
191. Id
192. C. BLACK, supra note 13, at 42-43.
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created in the constitutional text, the courts could hardly refuse to decide matters on the ground that a perfectly representative body-the
Congress-also had authority to remedy the matter, for it is Congress
that has given the courts a mandate for decisions in such cases in the
first place. The bar to judicial intervention only appeared if you
thought the underpinning for review was somehow derived from
Stone's advice as to how it should be administered.
In the balance of the chapter on structural approaches, Tushnet
analyzes how these approaches treat the issues of equal protection, due
process, and federalism. The attack never varies; it has three moves: 1)
The theory is redefined in prudential terms as setting forth criteria
against which policy must be measured-here the enhancement of representation, i.e., the revelation through election of voter preferences;
2) This redefinition requires that the underlying connection to the
Constitution be suppressed-its source in the structures and relationships of the Constitutional text-while it is this connection that otherwise enables the legitimating goal of the theory; 3) The new, redefined
standard is assessed, and it is shown, rather persuasively I think, that a
naturalistic, non-conventional definitional scheme of the kind on which
such a standard depends for its justification is discredited by current
opinion in a number of cognate academic disciplines. Such criticisms
can be drawn from historiography,
or semiotics, or even, as here, from
19 3
contemporary political science.
And the conclusion never varies; one might say that within the subjects treated in the structural chapter, as among the various forms of
argument that comprise Part I of the book, ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny. Thus, in the midst of the discussion of equal protection,
Tushnet pauses to say:
The argument so far is this: (a) when the theory is confined to formal
obstacles to representation, it yields so few constraints on legislative
behavior that criticisms are convincing; and (b) a theory that considers
informal obstacles to representation cannot constrain judges. Its adherents find it attractive because it falsely appears to them as a19defense
4
of the main lines of contemporary American liberal thought.
But the ways in which these transformations are done is by no means as
tedious as the reiterated conclusions may make it seem. On the contrary, they are very artful, even approaching the pyrotechnical performances once got in Laurence Tribe.' 9 5 Consider Tushnet's treatment of
equal protection from a structural point of view:
193. But there are risks to eclecticism; see, for example, p. 101 n.71, for what amounts
to a kind of caricature of microeconomic approaches to political problems.
194. P. 99.
195. E.g., Laurence H. Tribe, Foreword: Toward a Model of Roles in the Due Process of Life and
Law, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1, 33-41 (1973) (defending Roe v. Wade on game theory grounds);
Laurence H. Tribe, Unraveling National League of Cities: The New Federalismand Affirmative
Rights to Essential Governmental Services, 90 HARv. L. REV. 1065 (1977) (defending National
League of Cities v. Usery on grounds of individual rights).
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The third paragraph of the Carolene Products footnote refers to "discrete and insular minorities." How does that fit into the theory? According to the theory, public policy must be based upon revealed
preferences. The law of disfranchisement and free speech deals with
how preferences are revealed. The law of equal protection deals with
how policy is based on revealed preferences. Discrete and insular minorities are groups which are allowed to participate in19 the
representa6
tive process but whose voices will not be listened to.
This is a very interesting and creative reconstruction of structural
argument along prudential lines. Now the theory of structural argument is that the Constitution does not tolerate policies that are inconsistent with those commitments to the significant relationships among
the various structures-bicameralism, federalism, and so forth--ordained in the Constitution. Whether these relationships accurately reflect revealed preferences or not hardly enters into it. Indeed,
"revealed preferences" is economists' jargon for the axiomatic personal inferences to be drawn from the market actions of a consumer; it
is highly debatable whether a voter is imitating such a market actor
when he or she votes, attends a precinct meeting, or signs a petition
and so forth, that is when he or she participates in a process that is
defined by its removal of decisionmaking from the market. But by giving this microeconomic twist to the terms, Tushnet transforms the constitutional processes of legislation and litigation into a market where
disappointed bidders can have a second chance at the goods with respect to which they were outbid in the original market. Thus, Tushnet
writes: "[P]eople litigate constitutional claims when they seek to alter
the result of the representational process in which they were losers.
That is, such claims are made only by those who were in the minority
19 7
on the issue when it was before the legislature."
98
Even if we confine ourselves to equal protection jurisprudence,1
one must ask whether this is a natural reading of Bakke 19 9 or Mow Sun
Wong,200 to say nothing of the alien education cases (since aliens, were
we to adhere to Tushnet's view of structuralism, have no judicially cognizable rights since they have no right to representation). In an era of
public interest advocacy, we may be inclined to forget that most equal
protection challenges, like most constitutional challenges generally, are
incidental to the civil and criminal processes. They are interposed by
defendants whose interest seldom extends beyond their own well-being. Seeing it as incidental to the legislative process is, however, helpful to set up the balance of the argument: "The theory must therefore
196. P. 94.

197. lId
198. Since the model described scarcely seems relevant to such quintessentially structural opinions as Morrison v. Olson, 108 S. Ct. 2597 (1988) (the special prosecutor case), and
INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (striking down the legislative veto).
199. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
200. Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976).
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distinguish between discrete and insular minorities, whose preferences
are not taken into account, and other minorities, who are simple losers.
Yet if we regard the political process as pluralist... we run up against
' 20 1
rather serious difficulties as we try to draw the required lines.
By taking ChiefJustice Stone's prudential standard for deference to
the legislature, and making it the criterion justifying structural argument, Tushnet can then legitimately ask when legislative losers fall into
the magical category of the "discrete and insular minority," and attack
the shifting real-world nature of such a definition. Tushnet says: "If
the courts intervene even on the facially discriminatory statute, they
may be displacing political judgments that resulted from a process in
which all preferences were in fact taken into account. This outcome
may occur whenever a group is not equally concerned about all the
20 2
items on its agenda."
This utterly reduces structural argument to politics. For structural
purposes, it ought not to matter if the duly elected representatives of
the "discrete and insular minority" coldbloodedly bargained away their
constituents' rights. If a necessary constitutional relationship is compromised thereby, the legislative act cannot stand. The Constitution
puts such a bargain beyond the bounds of politics. The quoted passage
assumes that the purpose of judicial intervention to apply the equal
protection clause, on structural grounds, is to assure a fair outcome of a
fair bargaining process, where fairness is equated with equal representation. In fact, the purpose is to insure that no discriminatory outcome
results no matter how it is arrived at. Imagine a modern-day Marcus
Garvey who successfully negotiates a lucrative exile for blacks or a state
legislature that decides to permit proxy voting in elections because it
more closely tracks the opinion polls. For the structuralist, the constitutional bonds of citizenship cannot be bargained away.
According to Tushnet,
Ely's Democracy and Distrust is the most elaborate recent treatment of
this theory. [Ely] concludes that the theory treats the following groups
as minorities: blacks (with some labor on Ely's part), gays, and perhaps
women with respect to statutes enacted prior to around 1950. On 20
the3
whole the theory does not appear to be very powerful in this setting.
From a structural point of view, Ely's theory is powerful if it offers a
clear demarcation derived from the relationships implicit in the structures set up in the Constitution, because this satisfies its underlying reason for being. But for Tushnet, it is not "powerful" unless it includes
more groups. It would be more "powerful" if, for example, Ely could
generate an outcome that also labeled as minorities the aged, the handicapped, religious and ethnic groups, and so on. And this helps explain
201. Pp. 94-95.

202. P. 95.
203. P. 99 n.65.
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the difficulties Tushnet encounters with pluralism, because pretty soon
this list starts to look like just a list of interest groups. Tushnet seems
unaware that he has generated this difficulty by ignoring the basis for
minority status that Ely has derived from the Constitution because that
was its only legitimatesource, not simply because it was an avenue that usefully served the purpose of inclusion. Indeed, Tushnet bridles at Ely's
reliance on the constitutional text as a necessary basis for
20 4
structuralism.
Tushnet concludes the chapter with a paragraph on the relevance of
federalism. Even in closing, he addresses a central constitutional structure from a prudentialist point of view. His virtuosity does not fail him.
Since
smaller groups are easier to organize than larger ones, and groups concentrated in one location are likely to develop ties of friendship and
cooperation that further ease the burden of organizing an opposition
to outside efforts at control [and made civic education easier]
... feder20 5
alism is as much a process of representation as voting is.
Actually, federalism is probably not a process of representation so
much as the topological boundarying that voting requires if it is to be
representational. But a more important point is this: It is unnecessary
to go through this ungainly approach to make federalism relevant to
structural argument unless you have forgotten the constitutional basis
for such argument. With the wistful tone of a political scientist who
could have designed a better system but who despairs of its realization
in the hands of the clods running it now, Tushnet concludes: "We
would have a quite attractive democratic representative process if we
could perfect it. But the courts certainly cannot, and the citizenry
20 6
might find the task overwhelming."
Be that as it may, this has nothing to do with structural argument,
and nothing to do with the Constitution (which nowhere directs the
government to perfect it, and would have provided for a very different
system if it did). Indeed, the very basis for the legitimacy of structural
argument-that it maintains the constitutional arrangement-would
progressively vanish, like an insincere smile.
204. P. 180. Tushnet argues that it is problematic for representation-reinforcing review
to resort to textualism (although Tushnet calls this originalism). "[G]rand theories must be
pure; representation-reinforcement review cannot survive if, at convenient places, it requires
an infusion of originalism." See pp. 179-87 (ch. 5, "Intuitionism and Little Theory"). This is
an extremely controversial modal issue: Are the forms of argument confined to each one's
parameters, respectively, or is there interpenetration, or is there even a hierarchy of modes?
But it is not appropriate here because structuralism begins with inferences from the text;
indeed that is one of the significant distinctions between structural and prudential argument
and is why the structuralist rejects so-called external criteria by which to measure a particular
"allocation."
205. Pp. 106-07.
206. P. 107.
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ETHICAL ARGUMENT

By ignoring the constitutional basis for each of the forms of argument-thus treating strictly constitutional norms as unrelated to interpretation-Tushnet eviscerates what is particularly legal about these
forms; thus ethical argument, in his hands, is no more than moral argument, depicted from a prudential point of view.
Thus far we have seen a consistent pattern of attack on the four
preceding forms of argument: historical, textual, doctrinal, and structural. In each case, Tushnet's complaint about the interpretive form
was not that it failed to capture his view that law is simply politics,
though that may be his opinion. 20 7 Rather, the problem was that by
treating law as no more than politics and by reinterpreting each of the
forms along prudentialist lines, Tushnet generated problems that the
forms could not resolve.
"Ethical argument" is a term of art, the meaning of which is less
intuitively obvious than those of the other forms of argument. It denotes argument that relies on an appeal to those elements of the American cultural ethos as reflected in the Constitution. The fundamental
American Constitutional ethos is the idea of limited government, the
presumption of which assumes that all residual authority remains in the
private sphere. Thus, ethical arguments are principally limit arguments: They usually arise as a consequence of the fundamental American constitutional arrangement by which rights are defined as those
choices beyond the power of government to compel. Structural and
ethical arguments share certain similarities. Like structural arguments,
ethical arguments arise from certain textual commitments in the Constitution, specifically the ninth and tenth amendments, and potentially
the privileges and immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment.
But, also like structural arguments, they do not depend on the construction of any particular piece of text, but rather on the necessary
relationships that can be inferred from the overall arrangement captured by the text. The tenth amendment, we are often reminded, is a
truism; but the same may also be said of the ninth, because it simply
restates the fundamental understanding of the federal system of powers
and rights. The privileges and immunities clause might also be characterized as superfluous to the extent that the fourteenth amendment has
superimposed the federal system of human rights on the states (a goal
we have relied upon the textualist strategy of incorporation to achieve).
The principal error one can make regarding ethical argument is to assume that any statute or executive act is unconstitutional if it produces
effects that are incompatible with the American ethos. This equates
"ethical argument," a constitutional form, with moral argument generally, which has no special constitutional status.
207. See Mark Tushnet, Truth, Justice and the American Way: An Interpretationof Public Law
Scholarship in the Seventies, 57 TEx. L. REv. 1307 (1979).
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Therefore, Tushnet's failure to link ethical argument to the Constitution is particularly costly. Instead of identifying those questions the
Constitution allocates to the moral judgment of individuals and nongovernmental actors, (however that judgment might be evaluated from
a philosophical or moral point of view) we have instead the familiar
prudential reconstruction of the issue: Does a particular philosophical
or moral approach provide an "objective" ranking of values that would
enable us to derive an algorithm that would maximize those values? If it
doesn't, then judges are unconstrained and the approach is insufficient;
if it does, it probably depends on naturalistic claims about the sources
of morality that are philosophically controversial.
Tushnet begins with the question of whether or not judges should
exercise moral judgments, an issue that he treats as neither moral nor
legal, but rather as appropriate to the sociologist of ideas. The tasks of
moral philosophers, he contends, are actually very much like those of
judges.
First, he examines the option of relying on "Systematic Moral Philosophy." Assume that human conduct can be divided into two (the
morally prohibited and the morally required) or three (adding the morally permissible) categories of acts.20 8 Tushnet then observes that it
follows that
These philosophies must identify the boundaries between the categories. That task resembles the need to identify issues on which moral
learning is preferable. [Such] line drawing and issue identification
tasks have produced consensus on the formulation of the solution. We
have to distinguish between fundamental, basic, or human rights on
the one hand and nonfundamental, less basic rights on the other....
Then, according to the present theory, courts can enforce the judgments of moral philosophy. First they must decide whether a fundamental right is implicated by the statute in question. If it is, courts
whether the statute has reached a morally impermismust then decide
09
sible result.

2

"The positive case for relying on moral philosophy thus turns on the
other rights
ability of judges to distinguish between fundamental 2and
10
and then to decide what moral philosophy requires.
If courts could in fact apply moral philosophy in their judgments in
this way, how would they go about reaching such judgments? Tushnet
considers two possible methods: 1) by invoking the claims of a particular system, and 2) by reflecting the moral consensus of society. Notice
that despite the use of terms like "fundamental rights," Tushnet ne208. "There are slight differences between the two approaches: In a two-category system finding that no fundamental right is implicated means that we might have a morally impermissable result but still prefer under these circumstances to learn from experience. In a
three-category system finding that no fundamental right is implicated means that the statute is
morally neutral." P. 111 n.10.
209. Pp. 110-11.
210. P. 111.
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glects to say how the Constitution requires moral argument. We therefore cannot determine whether either of the two proposed methods
would actually serve the constitutional requirement. And yet "neglects" is not the right word: Tushnet, like any thorough-going
prudentialist, doesn't believe that there are any constitutional reasons
for invoking a particular form of argument other than to promote a
particular political agenda. That is why Tushnet doesn't address the
constitutional basis for ethical argument, but rather proceeds directly
to evaluate moral arguments as a means of serving prudential ends.
And when, not surprisingly, moral argument is shown to be far too indeterminate for such a role, it is abandoned as insufficient for a program (the "liberal tradition") that neither Tushnet nor the advocates of
moral argument shared in the first place (but one that Tushnet firmly
believes lies behind the pious claims for moral approaches for their
own constitutional sake).
Tushnet asserts that "the liberal traditions' insistence that judges be
constrained commits it to a rule-oriented moral philosophy, in which
'2 11
relatively general rules are stated and applied to individual cases.
This appears to confuse the rule-oriented nature of doctrinalism with
"rule-oriented moral philosophy." It mechanically takes the common
law tradition of deciding appeals on doctrinal lines and substitutes the
idea "moral" for "legal." But it has scarcely been argued that legal
rules that result from ethical argument have the same syntactical structure as the moral sentiments on which they rely or the doctrinal arguments with which Tushnet confuses them. Let me give an example.
A well-known model of ethical argument occurs in the case of Moore
v. City of East Cleveland.2 12 In Moore, the Supreme Court confronted an
Ohio ordinance that limited occupancy of a dwelling unit to members
of a single family. Under this ordinance, a 63-year-old grandmother
was convicted of having failed to remove a grandson from her house.
The decision by Justice Powell turns on this passage: "Ours is by no
means a tradition limited to respect for the bonds uniting the members
of the nuclear family. The tradition of uncles, aunts, cousins, and especially grandparents sharing a household along with parents and children has roots equally venerable and equally deserving of
constitutional recognition." 21 3 The legal rule here, which forms a part
of the ethical argument, is that the state may not coerce living arrangements that rend family life. But the moral sentiment-that the relationship between grandmother and grandchild is preciously,
paradigmatically familial-is neither a rule nor derived from a rule.
A second, more difficult, example can be gleaned from Roe v.
Wade. 2 14 An ethical argument supporting the holding in that case
211.
212.
213.
214.

P. 112.
431 U.S. 494 (1977).
Id at 504.
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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would be: 1) The American ethos would not tolerate state coercion of
intimate acts; 2) A woman's pregnancy and giving birth are paradigmatically intimate acts; 3) Criminal abortion statutes result in such coercion
by forcing a woman to carry pregnancies to term. Point 2 reflects a
moral sentiment while point 1 states a legal rule allegedly derived from
the Constitution's allocation of certain decisions to non-governmental
actors. Like the argument in Moore, this is a truncated summary. It
omits the constitutional groundwork laid by the allocation of personal
liberty to the individual that is the consequence of the arrangement of
government powers and inferred personal rights that forms our Constitution.2 15 It is precisely because certain means are not appropriate to
the powers of government-means such as dictating who counts as a
family member for inclusion in private homes, or coercing women (or
school children, or the welfare family for that matter) to carry out acts
of great personal intimacy-that there can be an element of moral decision. One asks: Does this case (the criminal abortion law or the sex
education class or the zoning ordinance or the low income housing reg2 16
ulation) fit the rule?

Consider, instead, how Tushnet treats the issue:
Before deciding whether the woman's decision to have the abortion
or bear the child is the right thing to do, most of us would want to
know... the conditions under which the pregnancy occurred, her notions of her own potential, her aspirations, her religious convictions,
and so on almost indefinitely. Of course the consideration of context
must end at some point, for she must make a decision one way or the
play a small part in the process or
other. But moral rules are likely to
2 17
in our evaluation of her decision.
The last sentence hardly follows. The reason we are asking all these
factual questions is to enable us to make a moral decision. Otherwise,
the questions would be different. Tushnet thinks rules are like: "Never
'hit' 17 when you play against the dealer"; 2 18 that is, that they are directions we consult in difficult or uncertain circumstances. But most rulefollowing is like that which enables us to generate a new sentence.
Knowing the rule lies in being able to go on; the rule is not external to
the practice, though of course a rule may be stated in retrospect. Yet
Tushnet continues:
The... argument is that, whenever we look at claims that some set
of moral truths implies that certain social arrangements are morally required, permissible, or prohibited, we find that the connections be215. See William Van Alstyne, The Fate of ConstitutionalIpse Dixits (Book Review), 33 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 712 (1983) (criticizing this omission).
216. P. BoBBrrr, supra note 3, at 142-56.

217. P. 113.
218. This is slang for advice to a blackjack player. It means: Don't ask for another card
if your own cards total 17; since ties are won by the dealer, the odds shift against you in these
circumstances.
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tween the general truths and the particular results are incredibly ad
hoc. This produces a well-grounded skeptical belief that people are
just dressing up their personal preferences
and presenting them as the
2 19
products of abstract moral reasoning.
Because Tushnet has no basis for distinguishing the constitutional
source of ethical argument from systematic moral arguments generally,
he cannot then distinguish between the ethical rule derived from such a
constitutional mandate and the specific "result" that he objects to as
being ad hoc. If he were to make these distinctions, he would not complain that the application of ethical rules to a specific context is merely
the result of personal preferences. On the contrary, this is what the
Constitution requires. As he ably shows in this very chapter, how could
it be otherwise?
Tushnet indicts David A.J. Richards-who has probably done more
than any other scholar to move moral issues into legal analysis 22 0 -on
just this point. He writes: "Richards finds in the Constitution a theory
of human rights involving 'the belief that every person has a capacity
for autonomy, and... the principle that every person has the right to
equal concern and respect in pursuit of his autonomy,' "221 and he
takes Richards to task for relying on what seem to Tushnet to be entirely contingent facts about the role of the nuclear family. "[T]he
broader point, the contingency of the relationship between biological
parenthood and the values from which Richards attempts to derive parental rights, can be seen in another way by imagining a society only
slightly different from our own.... Imagine... a system in which the
initial assignment of young people to older people is routinely recon22 2
sidered after two years."
Such passages show that Richards is reasoning in a legal mode,
while Tushnet is acting more like a political science professor I once
heard who asked: "Suppose we didn't have a Senate?" Well, suppose
we did reassign infants to different "parents" at 2 years of age, and reassign them again at age 4, age 6, and so on. Such a constitutional system
would be so different from ours-such a world would be so differentthat determining the effect of a zoning ordinance on the "family"
would be the least of the problems we would confront. But isn't the
hypothetical intended to challenge readers for whom "parents," "family," etc., have meanings strongly connected to the contingent facts of
our lives, and to our cultural history? Tushnet refuses to take seriously
Richards's claim that the Constitution would have us enforce a general
rule ("every person has the right to equal concern") and focuses instead on the specific, moral claim. He writes, acidly, that "[t]o speak of
219. Pp. 114-15 (footnote omitted).
220. See, e.g., DAVID AJ. RICHARDs, TOLERAION AND THE CONSTITUTION (1986); David
AJ. Richards, The Individual, the Family, and the Constitution, 55 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1 (1980).
221. P. 115.
222. P. 117 (footnote omitted).
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certain young people as 'my' children is already to be committed to a
2 23
rather comprehensive moral theory."
Of course this is true. If there were no notions such as "my children" it would be hard to make concrete sense of the constitutional
command that, in those circumstances not allocated to governmental
power, private decisions shall govern. And of course the Constitution
did not enact the systematic moral theory of Immanuel Kant any more
than it did Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics.224 But the claim of ethical argument is that, having established that the decision has been allocated to the moral sphere, systematic moral philosophies may play a
decisive role. I myself am skeptical of the utility of such systems; I
gather that Tushnet shares such skepticism. That, however, is a discussion for the philosophy common-room. With respect to constitutional
interpretation, it does not discredit ethical approaches to show that the
basis on which some persons make decisions is unsound, any more than
an attack on, say, the theory of general equilibrium discredits prudential argument.
Still, Tushnet prefers to treat the entire matter as a question of prudence. He writes:
Judicial review means that courts can sometimes displace judgments
made by legislators. The theory being considered here would fail if
judges were not better than legislators at working down from abstract
principles to particular judgments. There are several reasons, though,
to be skeptical about
claims that judges are indeed systematically better
22 5
than legislators.
This would make the approach of ethical argument amount to: "Do
good!" It would, as Tushnet suggests, turn on our real-world assessments of the likelihood that constitutional decisions are more or less
likely to bring about a better world. This transforms this form of argument into prudentialism, with the external standard-against which the
costs and benefits are measured-a moral one.
By contrast, ethical approaches (using that phrase as a term of art to
denote a particular mode of constitutional interpretation) hold that,
whether better or not, judges are required to recognize arguments in
an ethical modality because of the Constitution's role in society, its
commitments (not those of the judges), and so on. Seeing the role of
such arguments as matters of utility only, however, it was not jarring to
have Tushnet introduce the theory of the second-best as a reason not to
6
permit judicial review. 22
223. P. 118.
224. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 74 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
225. P. 120 (emphasis added).
226. "The analogy [of the theory of the second-best] to political action is appealing, for
some actions that alleviate an immediate problem may, by reducing political pressure, delay
the rectification of other, perhaps greater, injustices." P. 122. "Sometimes a judge might
decide to perpetuate an existing injustice that hurts real people present before her or him so
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Nor was it surprising when Tushnet offered "The Pragmatic Defense of the Theory." Having restated ethical argument to turn on its
practical effects, one might well expect that if it were to be defended, it
would have to be in this way: "[T]here is a lingering sense that, all
things considered, it is good to have judges thinking that they should
do the right thing. Lingering is the operative word here. It is a residue
of the nation's experience with the Warren Court. ' 2 27 That is, a residue of a political program with which "liberals" are in sympathy, a program advanced by this form of argument. Tushnet identifies Chief
Justice Warren with the "good"-Earl Warren's "instincts .. .reso-

nated strongly with the best values in American society."' 228 He thus
establishes, from a prudential point of view, both the case for ethical
2 29
argument and an external standard by which to measure its results.
As an example of this "defense," Tushnet recounts the moving
story told by Kenney Hegland about a small town Southern judge who
told a rural sheriff: "The law requires you to protect the demonstra23 0
tors. If you don't, I have no choice but to hold you in contempt."
Citing this story, Tushnet says: "This is an essentially pragmatic defense of the theory: whatever the theory's analytic merits or defects, it
works in society to protect valued interests. Like all pragmatic arguments, this one must
be examined in light of the actual operation of
231
today's courts."
But is Hegland's really a pragmatic defense of ethical argument, or
rather an effort to call attention to the unusual power ofjudicial review
when it is perceived as legitimate? That is, is it a claim that adherence
to law works for "the good," or is it a claim about how "the good"
works? Written as a response to deconstructionists, who are notoriously insensitive to the legal consequences ofjudicial reasoning, 23 2 it is
acutely relevant here because of its emphasis on the backdrop of compliance that the law engages-and this is scarcely a matter of doing
that an indefinite but it is hoped larger number of people will be hurt less in the more or less
distant future." P. 122 n.44.
This is an awkward analogy to second-best theory, for if the analogy held, the judge could
not make the decision to defer on the grounds that to do so would help others-or might help
them-because the theory holds that one simply can't tell. More importantly, this sort of
suggestion is what happens when we substitute moral or deontic modalities for legal ones: by
what authority does a judge "perpetuate" a legally redressable wrong to satisfy his or her
hope that good will come of it?
227. P. 123.
228. P. 133.
229. ChiefJustice Warren was certainly a forthright proponent of ethical argument, as,
for example, in Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). G. EDwARD WHrrE, EARL
WARREN: A PUBLIC LIFE (1982) (discussing Warren's contributions in the ethical argumentation of constitutional cases), is a valuable contribution on this point.
230. P. 123 n.45 (citing Kenney Hegland, Goodbye to Deconstrucion, 58 S. CAL. L. REv.
1203, 1219 (1985)).
231. P. 124 (footnote omitted).
232. There is no reason in principle why this should be true. For an excellent counterexample, see J.M. Balkin, Deconstructive Practice and Legal Theory, 96 YALE LJ. 743 (1987).
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"good" in the eyes of those who are likely to differ with such a characterization. Tushnet partly sees this and thinks it is a weakness of
Hegland's position. He writes: "One difficulty with this position, to
the extent that it truly does concede the validity of the challenges to the
theory, is that it assumes that political opponents will not figure out
that something is going wrong in the constitutional theory that is being
used to harm them."' 233 But Hegland need not postulate the stupidity
of his opponents-as Tushnet is required to do-unless he ignores the
distinction between the form of ethical argument (which maintains legitimacy and thus induces compliance) and the moral and political
claims that determine the outcomes of such arguments.
Tushnet conflates the two as a way of setting up his own prudential
assessments-we shall shortly see that he wishes to use Hegland's observation as the introduction to a "test" to determine whether good is
actually done by courts. For the prudentialist, legitimacy is entirely in
the womb of history: History has vindicated the civil rights revolution
(hence the nostalgic references to the Warren Court). This sweeps
aside the legitimacy that is won by adherence to ethical argument per se.
We should remember that Hegland's demonstrators would have been
in a very different situation if they had had to wait on history for the law
to be enforced. Tushnet's argument is simply one more manifestation
of his lack of concern for the status of his own modal perspective. In
attempting to discredit Hegland's position by turning to current decisions, 2 34 Tushnet ignores the point that if the Constitution mandates
ethical arguments, it is irrelevant to the legitimacy of those arguments
that the mix of winners and losers (from Tushnet's viewpoint, or that of
any political perspective) changes over time. But this is precisely what
Tushnet wishes to rely on-that from a particular viewpoint (that of the
"liberal"), recent constitutional cases do not justify faith in judicial
review.
Tushnet concludes:
What does this record add up to? Not much from any point of view.
Liberals might be pleased by some of the political cases, although it is
difficult to believe that, for example, editorializing by public broadcasters is likely to do a lot for the liberal cause. They should be troubled
by the campaign finance case, though.... Liberals thus have gotten
some things from recent first amendment cases, but they have lost
some things as well. Of course that means that conservatives are in the
same situation. 23 5
Against such an assessment, the prudentialist must balance the
probable outcomes in the absence of judicial review:
233. P. 124 n.46.
234. "In the last four years of the Burger Court, the Supreme Court upheld a few more
than a dozen free speech claims and rejected about twice as many." P. 124.
235. P. 126 (footnotes omitted).
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Consider what might happen if the Court announced that five years
from now it would no longer entertain free speech claims. We would
be driven back upon ourselves, forced to confront our desire to repress
....
[W]e might learn from our mistakes and gradually take control of
our lives ....What makes the scenario troubling to some is their sense
that legislators would go hog-wild once the threat ofjudicial review was
removed. Right now they just try to repress at the margins .... The
scenario includes a five-year delay to provide a period for civic education and thoughtful consideration of fundamental questions. If we
knew that we had to rely on our legislators, we might become more
2 36
careful in choosing them. But we might not.
This kind of speculative political science 2 37 has very little attraction
for me; it is hard to take terribly seriously. But if I were to speculate on
these lines, I suppose I would have to say that: 1) We already rely on
our legislators now for the most important governmental decisions in
society; giving them even more responsibility is unlikely to do much for
our acting responsibly as citizens; 2) Our citizenry would require "civic
education" of the kind perfected by the Khmer Rouge before the legal
forms of first amendment jurisprudence would become the daily fare
for reflection-indeed, the first year of law school, which may be said to
have something in common with forced re-education camps, does not
even wholly succeed at this; 3) This is to say nothing of the need for
inducing mass amnesia-for even if the Court is to cease deciding
cases, there will still be a considerable body of case law to which the
public and lawyers will have resort, indeed which is probably the chief
(though indirect) source of the public's understanding of the Constitution; and 4) That finally, the "scenario" treats the members of the
branches of government like so many billiard balls, colliding or sometimes caroming off rails, with no self-awareness; but legislators have
their own views of free speech, which views are, not surprisingly, also
largely the product of the courts' work (that is, they are structured in a
way that corresponds to the forms of common law argument).
As I say, I have little gift for this sort of political "science"; yet I
simply do not see how these fanciful speculations, about which I have
some reservations, could possibly support the confident conclusion that
238
"U]udicial review in first amendment cases is thus a mixed blessing."
The reason for this, Tushnet concludes, is that "liberals can take only a
little comfort from the general framework of first amendment law if
they consider it in purely pragmatic terms. We [must assume the same
is true for constitutional theory generally since we] cannot perform a
9
complete pragmatic survey of constitutional law here. ' 23
In the final section of this chapter, "The Moral Philosophy of the
236.
237.
238.
239.

P. 128.
The necessity for it is one of the shortcomings of prudential argument.
P. 128.
P. 131.
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Community," Tushnet discusses an alternative way of developing
moral argument; but because here, as before, he is unsure what constitutional status such argument should have, his discussion varies in its
helpftilness.
He begins by identifying four well-known objections to relying on
the moral sense of the community as an element in judicial review:
First, the judges must identify both what the common values are
and what these values imply for the resolution of the issue they face.
Judges could rely on surveys or on their consciences. Yet surveys consistently show great sensitivity to variations in the way questions are
phrased. [Their results often appear contradictory or of such a general
nature as to be of little help in deciding a specific case.] .. . Public

views on such statutes are likely to be unformed and unavailable to the
courts. The difficulty in asking the judges to consult their consciences
to determine what common values are is that, as we have seen, judges
are drawn from a narrow stratum of our society and what they consider
to be common values may instead be the reflection of their personal
experience.
Second... the level of generality on which the common values are
identified is open to substantial manipulation....
Third, one undeniable value in our society is federalism ....Any
apparently aberrational regulation can be defended as the expression
of some complex common value, such as "Privacy, taking federalism
into account." In this view a locality can prohibit sodomy precisely because its intrusion on privacy is justified by the fact that homosexuals
can move to cities and states more tolerant of the practice.
Finally, in any constitutional case courts have before them one initem of evidence about common values, the regulation at
disputable
24 0
issue.
Before discussing these four points, let us take stock: we have seen
that Tushnet's fundamental posture-to adopt a prudential point of
view, and then evaluate each of the forms of argument by transmuting
them into prudential positions-largely dictates his analysis. With regard to ethical argument, Tushnet ignores the constitutional basis for
such arguments, and is then obliged to come up with some reason for
using ethical arguments. For the prudentialist, this can only be the fact
that ethical arguments work, that is, they serve a particular moral or
political agenda. Tushnet does not face the question for whom such a
standard works because he has postulated a group whom judicial review must satisfy-the liberals. Thus the first section of this chapter
was devoted to an evaluation of recent cases as to whether their outcomes would please or upset liberals. Finding that there was much to
displease liberals does not necessarily discredit "systematic moral philosophy"; there may be other systems than the ones currently in vogue
at the Supreme Court that would serve such goals. But it does cast
240. Pp. 134-36 (footnotes omitted).
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doubt on the ability ofjudges, through a competition in such systems,
to arrive at the results Tushnet is looking for.
How then can we use moral argument to determine what is the
"good," so that judges can act on that determination? "Instead of
looking to systematic moral philosophy in the abstract, theory might
direct its attention
to the philosophy of justice implicit in our
'24 1
community."
But here also, the severing of any constitutional connection renders
the approach unsound. Objections 3 & 4 above are fatal for the
prudentialist version of ethical approaches: If the question has become
whether we can look to the community for our moral judgments and
thus enable judges to know what is the "good," then legislators and
policemen have every right to say that the very practices being challenged are far likelier to reflect community values, having been adopted
through communal processes, than lawyerly attacks on those practices.
If, on the other hand, we accept the constitutional basis for ethical
argument-that the Constitution commits some decisions to private
parties by supreme law, that it commits governments to conform to certain guarantees and disempowers governments from acting inconsistently with those commitments-then acts of legislatures or executives
to the contrary notwithstanding, we will still demand judicial decisions
that may legitimately turn on the moral standards professed by the
community in media other than its statute books. Indeed, once that
link is made, objections 3 and 4 appear entirely fanciful. It may well be
that the community standards of Topeka endorse segregation. Yet the
issue of the ethos of a society is relevant not in the air, but in answer to
the legal question: Does equal protection tolerate the segregation of
persons by the state on account of race? It gives us an answer by determining whether (for this society) shunning and physical demarcation,
traditionally the marks of a caste system, are in fact incidents of the
equal regard the law is supposed to afford.
The first two objections are more substantial, but each of these also
depends on ignoring the constitutional basis for ethical argument that
is a consequence of treating this form as though it were merely the way
Elmer Gantry would do prudential argument.
Let us begin with the objection based on "the level of generality."
It appears that, like William Van Alstyne, 24 2 he takes the argument in
Constitutional Fate regarding Roe to be: 1) There is no government
power to coerce intimate acts; 2) A mother's pregnancy and giving birth
are paradigmatically intimate acts; 3) Criminal abortion statutes result
241. P. 133.
242. See note 215 supra. For a discussion of the generality issue, see P. BoBBrrT, supra
note 3, at 154-56. To illustrate the manipulation of the generality issue, Tushnet first quotes
Laurence Tribe's treatise as proclaiming that "it makes all the difference in the world what
level of generality one employs" and then observes sarcastically that "it may be worth noting
... that Tribe argued the case against the Bowers statute." P. 135 nn. 92-93.
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in such coercion by forcing a mother to carry to term. Therefore, 4) A
criminal abortion statute is not constitutionally compatible with the
American ethos.
Such an argument, Tushnet believes, is subject to the objection of
generality: If we ask whether or not criminal abortion statutes per se,
and not the coercion of intimate acts, are tolerable within the American
ethos, the answer may well be yes; so the approach is really just a matter of "manipulating" the level43 of generality. The example Tushnet
2
analyzes is Bowers v. Hardwick:
The majority upheld the statute [criminalizing sodomy], devoting
much of its opinion to an enumeration of the statutes against sodomy
and the historical tradition of making it a criminal offense. It concluded, "Against this background, to claim that a right to engage in
[homosexual sodomy] is 'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition'.., is, at best, facetious." The four dissenters pointed to a244
more
general commitment in the society to privacy in sexual matters.
Is it simply then a matter of fixing an outcome, and then choosing
the level of inquiry to fit? I did argue that criminal abortion statutes are
unconstitutional because they are offensive to the American ethos of
limited government, an argument of which the four step rationale
above is a truncated version. But I emphatically did not and do not
argue that merely asserting that a statute has effects that are incompatible with the American ethos makes it unconstitutional. Rather, it is crucial to set up, as carefully as one can, a specifically constitutional basis
as a predicate for such considerations. One way to infer the specific
content of unenumerated rights 24 5 is to rely on the enumerated powers; that is, rights are those things that government is not given the
affirmative power to interfere with; therefore, as Madison and Hamilton
independently observed, even if there were no first amendment, the
federal government could not establish a church or suppress the press
because no affirmative powers to do so are granted.
Because the states are creatures of plenary, not enumerated constitutional power, such an inferential method does not appear to be available to the judge who conscientiously tries to enforce the civil war
amendments' obligation that the human rights norms that hitherto applied to the federal government must, henceforth, apply to the
states. 24 6 How do we infer the unenumerated rights against states
when the inferential method on which we relied vis-d-vis the federal
government is unavailable? Grappling with that conundrum has con243. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
244. P. 135.
245. See P. BoBBrrr, supra note 3, at 142-56. But this is only one way. Id Moreover, as
the equal protection example shows, there is a role for ethical arguments with respect to the
enumerated rights (analogous, perhaps, to the role of structural argument in the construction
of the enumerated powers).
246. Id
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sumed most 2of4 7 the post-Civil War history of constitutional
decisionmaking.
As the necessary constitutional predicate for the argument from the
American ethos, I proposed this method: If a particular statutory
means is denied to the federal government, then it is denied to the
states, even if the goal involved is permitted to the states. It is enough
to show that the means is denied the federal government for a court to
similarly deny such means to the states, even if the rationale for the
federal decision-that the means is not appropriate to any enumerated
federal goal, that the means is expressly forbidden in the Bill of Rights,
etc.-does not apply per se to the states. It remains only then to determine whether a criminal abortion statute is in fact such a means. That
part of the argument is excerpted in the four steps above.
This is not the place to defend the foregoing argument. Many will
disagree with either the constitutional premise regarding the inference
of unenumerated rights, or the assessment of the abortion statute. But
I draw attention to one feature of that argument: The level of generality is irrelevant, not decisive. Even if the purpose of the statute were to
promote world peace and harmony and every single American took an
oath claiming to believe that that statute would deliver it, the means
employed might still offend our ethos. If the majority in Bowers is persuasive, it is precisely because the actual conduct of homosexual sodomy did not, traditionally, correspond to our notions of intimacy but
instead seemed (perhaps erroneously) more like licentiousness.
Whether or not the argument regarding Roe is persuasive also depends
on whether the specifics of a woman's carrying a fetus to term corresponds to our ideas of intimacy. If they don't, then the level of generality-whether or not Americans want to protect privacy, on the one
hand, or fetal life on the other-is simply irrelevant.
But a prudentialist might not see that. He might think that the argument really was manipulable because he might not require that some
link to the structure of rights and powers in the Constitution be demonstrated before a legitimate, constitutional argument had been made.
It is the first objection, however-how we are determine the content
of the moral ethos-to which Tushnet, quite properly, devotes the
greatest attention. This discussion is largely centered on the work of
Ronald Dworkin:
Ronald Dworkin has grappled with the dialectical interplay between
criticism and apologetics more carefully than anyone else. His efforts,
which involve several attempts to work around the difficulty, have led
him to formulations that retain the critical intention but lack substantial
content.... Dworkin has offered... several approaches to adjudication, but all are premised on some sort of appeal to community
247. See Philip Bobbitt, The Ninth, Tenth, and Fourteenth Amendments: Rules for
Reading Constitutional Rights (work in progress).
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However, according to Tushnet, Dworkin uses community values to at249
tack community acts but doesn't really derive them.

What Tushnet ignores is that Dworkin struggles to provide a link to
constitutional argument. Dworkin asks what method of determining
community values is mandated by the Constitution, or is "relevant" in
Constitutional terms. It is this struggle that unites what Tushnet sees
only as "several attempts." So Tushnet really has it backwards when he
disparages the inescapable observation that Dworkin always makes arguments "taking as a given our community's commitment to the proposition that constitutional adjudication must rest on constitutional
interpretation." 250 Indeed Tushnet demonstrates that Dworkin, and
not he, has a clear understanding of the distinctions between ethical
and prudential argument, between ethical and moral argument, when
he disapprovingly observes that "moral philosophy enters Dworkin's
scheme not because it is good in itself that courts invoke moral philosophy but rather because moral philosophy is the only way to make sense
' 25
1
of our commitment to interpretation.
Tushnet appreciates the problematic nature, however, of any prescription purporting to rely on the American ethos:
Several authors, relying at least in part on some aspects of Dworkin's
analysis, have suggested ... [another] way to invoke a community's
commitment as the basis for judicial review. Instead of relying on
"common values" widely shared in the society at the time of decision,
courts could invalidate statutes because they are inconsistent with an
enduring consensus about fundamental values, as reflected in the language of the Constitution, decided cases, and our society's cultural heritage .... One might fairly wonder why we are not told that the deepest
values of our society require us to adopt a form of Christian socialism.
Or perhaps the enduring values of our society are what some would
describe as racist, sexist, and generally inegalitarian and intolerant ....
Or finally, perhaps there is no "deep consensus" in the United States
because the United States is simply the adventitious collection of people whose 52primary relationship is coresidence in an arbitrarily defined
2
territory.
248. P. 137.
249. If there is a criticism here of Dworkin, it is that he uses ethical argument hierarchically. That is, the method is used to generate the legal link by means of the other modestextual, doctrinal, historical, etc.-and then to decide among these modes, or among the
choices within modes, by seeking out the best moral argumentative conclusion. Hierarchy
among modes is an important issue for constitutional interpretation nowadays. See Fallon,
supra note 40. But this important modal issue is simply not available to Tushnet because,
despite the patina of modal appreciation, he is basically in the grip of one mode and never
achieves the perspective to see this and thus to question the implicit hierarchy of arguments.
250. P. 137.
251. P. 138.
252. Pp. 139-41 (footnotes omitted).
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This is an attack on ethical argument, which takes its name not from
ethics but from the ethos of the national community.
Tushnet fails, however, to appreciate the nature of a national ethos.
We can first dismiss the suggestion that the only thing in common in
our national culture is "coresidence in an arbitrarily defined territory."
But what about the questions regarding the nature of our ethos? Why
can't it be fundamentally Christian, socialist, racist, or so forth? Well,
some may say that it is, and they may be correct in some respects. The
important point is that these characterizations must link up with some
legal commitment in the Constitution. 253 Ethical argument does this in
several ways, one of which is to put certain choices outside the realm of
government control by extrapolating from the limits on the affirmative
subjects of power allocated to the federal government to limits on the
means permitted any constitutional government. Such a legal limit
protects the racist, the socialist, and the sexist. An ethos that protects
diversity and contradictions will accordingly be capable of characterization in many attractive-and not so attractive-ways. Now if one expects the characterization of the ethos to justify judicial review, one will
naturally demand a single, complete, non-contradictory, determinate,
and politically acceptable national ethos. Something like this ideology
is reflected in Tushnet's hunger for a republicanism of civic virtue. But
if instead you are analyzing a modality of argument-that is, the way in
which a particular constitutional argument is validated-you will expect
no more of such characterizations than that they arise from the necessities and possibilities of the Constitution itself.
A written constitution gives rise to textual arguments; a constitution
that derives rights from limits on power gives rise to ethical arguments.
It is therefore hardly surprising that Dworkin does not give us a list of
acceptable values, but requires only that, in carrying out the enterprise
I have specified, appeals to our values can be legitimately made.
Tushnet's sarcastic conclusion-that Dworkin's approach combines an
attractive method (an appeal in one form or another to the values held
by real communities) "with a pervasive inability to specify what those
253. Perhaps it would be well to review an example that shows the basic pattern of an
ethical argument. The American constitutionalethos is the reservation of powers not delegated
to a limited government.
In the Austin American-Statesman of May 26, 1988 (on file with the Stanford Law Review) it
was reported that a superior court judge in Phoenix had ordered an 18-year-old woman to
practice birth control for the rest of her child-bearing years as a condition of probation. An
ethical argument challenging such an offensive sentence would go like this:
1. There is no express constitutional power to implement a policy of eugenics.
2. Moreover, eugenics programs are not appropriate means to implement any of the
express powers of the federal government.
3. Those means denied the federal government are also denied the states.
4. The Phoenix sentence amounted to ordering a woman to comply with a eugenics
plan and hence is unconstitutional.
The American ethos at stake is the reservation to individuals and families of certain kinds
of decisions and behavior; this ethos is the very basis of our constitutional arrangement of
limited government.
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values are" 254-is misplaced.
The same criticism applies to his attack on Dworkin's metaphor as
to how judges, over time and geography, manage decisions that reflect
a continuity and consistency of values despite the chaos of human

passions:
Dworkin explains his view that law is a culture's interpretation of
itself by using a striking metaphor ....
[H]e asks us to consider the
enterprise of writing a collaborative novel. One person writes a chapter and sends it on to the next author, whose obligation is to write
another chapter that will make the novel the best it can be, given what
has gone before .... Dworkin argues that adjudication is like writing
this sort of novel .... The metaphor of the collaborative novel is indeed illuminating but not quite as Dworkin intends .... The difficulty
is that Dworkin has taken the classical novel as his exemplar. Suppose
instead that we took modernist25works
as our models. Discontinuity
5
pervades modernist novels ....
This carries forward, relentlessly, the awful symmetry of Tushnet's
attacks. His pattern for each of the other modes sought to discredit
them by showing that, on the latest thinking, they were simply impossible to carry out, as a practical matter: Historians no longer thought we
could recapture the past; hermeneuticists denied that texts impose
meaning; modern political scientists rejected the pluralism that underlay structure; and so on. Now we find that literary critics and novelists
would deny Dworkin his metaphor of the "novel seriatim":
Discontinuity pervades modernist novels, in part precisely to raise
questions about the category of "the novel." One view of modernist
254. P. 141.
255. Pp. 141-42 (footnotes omitted). Compare Dworkin's metaphor with a story told by
the great physicist John Wheeler about a game of "Twenty Questions":
"You recall how it goes-one of the after-dinner party [is] sent out of the living
room, the others agreeing on a word, the one fated to be questioner returning and
starting his questions. 'Is it a living object?' 'No.' 'Is it here on earth?' 'Yes.' So the
questions go from respondent around the room until at length the word emerges:
victory if in twenty tries or less; otherwise, defeat.
"Then comes the moment when I am... sent from the room. [I am] locked out
unbelievably long. On finally being readmitted, [I] find a smile on everyone's face,
sign of ajoke or a plot. [I] innocently start [my] questions. At first the answers come
quickly. Then each question begins to take longer in the answering-strange, when
the answer itself is only a simple 'yes' or 'no.' At length, feeling hot on the trail, [I]
ask, 'Is the word "cloud"?' 'Yes,' comes the reply, and everyone bursts out laughing.
When [I was] out of the room, they explain, they had agreed not to agree in advance
on any word at all. Each one around the circle could respond 'yes' or 'no' as he
pleased to whatever question [I] put to him. But however he replied he had to have a
word in mind compatible with his own reply-and with all the replies that went
before."
This story is an illuminating metaphor of the process of constitutional decision.
Note that if Wheeler had chosen to ask a different question, he would have ended up
with a different word. But, by the same token, whatever power he had in bringing a
particular word.-"cloud"-into being was only partial. The very questions he chose
arose from and were limited by the answers given previously.
P. BoBBrrr, supra note 3, at 238 (citations omitted).
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art holds that its aim is to force upon readers and viewers an awareness
of the artificiality of the artist's creation .... This view has unsettling
implications for Dworkin's approach, for it denies that there are stan2 56
dards of goodness of the sort that Dworkin seeks.
Here, as with the other approaches, Tushnet redefines the demands of
the modalities as if they were the ideological claims of prudentialism,
that is, as if they required external standards of validation ("standards
of goodness") to justify their approaches.
Tushnet concedes that Dworkin is talking only about the community
of judges and need not contradict the modernist assertion that there
are no universal communities. But Tushnet does not acknowledge that
the mere observation that "modernists" believe a particular idea commits him to the proposition that the notion of a community of interpretation is not nonsense.
Rather, Tushnet qualifies his concession by asserting that there is
no evidence, no "sociological fact," that would verify an assertion of
such a community: "Dworkin employs an incredibly casual empirical
theory ofjudicial socialization on which his entire edifice rests." 25 7 But
it takes little sociological research to establish that there exists a community ofjudges who share a vocabulary sufficiently coherent to enable
them to rely on each other's precedents and to use them to create new
precedents. The enterprise is not impossible, Tushnet's reading of literary criticism notwithstanding, unless it is so redefined as to become
impossible. As Dr. Johnson kicked a stone to refute Berkeley, one
might merely point to Shepard's. Nevertheless, Tushnet concludes that
"[t]he existence of a community of interpretation that includes writers
and readers, judges and citizens, is exactly what modernism places at
25 8
issue."
At the end of this chapter, Tushnet notes approvingly that "Michael
Perry has faced the difficulties of using moral philosophy in constitutional theory by calling on the judges to carry forth the prophetic
strand of our political tradition. 2 59 However, he notes that "Perry's
religious vision is so conventional-everything converges on the leftliberal wing of the Democratic Party. It would be engaging to find out
that God wants us to be vegetarians, or to disarm unilaterally, or to fire
'2 60
a pre-emptive nuclear first strike."
"Engaging" is not the right word, of course, but there is a wonderful A.A. Lorenz cartoon that captures this idea. A couple is looking out
their window into the Christmas night sky as Santa Claus, in his sleigh,
is being pulled up and away from their chimney by reindeer. Across the
back of his sleigh are numerous bumper stickers with slogans like "Reg256.
257.
258.
259.
260.

P.
P.
P.
P.
P.

142.
143 n.122.
143.
143 (footnote omitted).
144 n.125.
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ister Communists Not Firearms" and "Let's Get the U.S. Out of the
U.N." The wife is saying to the husband, "That's funny. For some reason I always thought of him as a liberal."
It is a good point. The difference between Perry and Dworkin is
precisely that Dworkin is conscientiously trying to craft ethical arguments-as that term of art is defined in constitutional law-while Perry
has abandoned that enterprise for a prudentialism whose moral goals
are forthrightly stated.
At the beginning of this chapter, Tushnet told this story:
One day, as Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes was leaving to go the
Supreme Court, a friend said to him: 'Well, off to do justice again!'
Holmes is said to have replied, 'Sonny, I don't do justice; I just make
sure that people play by the rules.' ... But the Justice's friend appealed
to a deeply rooted sense that judges can do something else-they can
provide justice. For our purposes "doing justice" means making sure
that the legal process produces morally acceptable outcomes. In this
view judges should uphold statutes that are morally permissible and
261
strike down those that are morally impermissible.
The contrast between this account and the actual anecdote is revealing on many grounds, but I will confine myself to one. The story
comes from a reminiscence of Holmes by Learned Hand:
I remember once I was with him; it was a Saturday when the Court was
to confer ....When we got down to the Capitol, I wanted to provoke a
response, so as he walked off, I said to him: "Well, sir, goodbye. Do
justice!" He turned quite sharply and he said: "Come here. Come
here." I answered, "Oh, I know, I know." He replied: "That is not my
'26 2
job. My job is to play the game according to the rules."
There is a world of difference between, on the one hand, trying conscientiously to play by the rules and, on the other hand, seeing your
task as making others do so. And there is an analogous difference between ethical arguments, with their mandate in the Constitution, and
moral arguments generally. When the legal process is justified on the
grounds that it produces morally acceptable outcomes, and not by its
adherence to rules, it is being judged on a prudential basis, and all the
other forms are merely sham. It is a pity that Tushnet, who is so clearly
2 63
interested in the various modes, has so little feel for them.
VIII.

PRUDENTIAL ARGUMENT

Tushnet never appreciates that he, along with the writers he criticizes, is imprisoned within a particular approach. By the end of Part I
261. P. 108 (footnotes omitted).

262.

LEARNED HAND, THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY

306-07 (3d ed. 1960).

263. Doubtless I am being too proprietary. Eight years after giving the Common Law
lectures, Holmes wrote to James Barr Ames of the Harvard Law faculty with what can hardly
be considered modesty: "My ideas on each subject, so far as I know were new, and have been
accepted as such." Quoted in HENRY FRIENDLY, BENCHMARKS 289 (1967).
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of Red, White, and Blue, the author has discussed five of the six modalities of argument: historical argument ("The Jurisprudence of History"), textual argument ("Textualism"), doctrinal argument ("Neutral
Principles"), structural argument ("TheJurisprudence of Democracy"),
and ethical argument ("TheJurisprudence of Philosophy"). Each chapter or subchapter deals with the theory under scrutiny by analyzing how
the countermajoritarian objection to judicial review is overcome under
that particular theory. 2 64 Tushnet decides to call these forms of argument "formalisms" since they provide "a set of public criteria by which
theorists, interested observers, and the judges themselves can evaluate
what judges do."12 65 When confronting his own ideological preference,

he is at a loss to recognize the underlying similarity. This preference he
decides to call "Anti-formalism," reflecting his assumption that
prudentialist thinkers do not merely offer yet one more form of argument. 2 66 Tushnet's discussion of the "anti-formalists" is curiously
truncated in light of his detailed descriptions of the partisans of other
approaches: "Owen Fiss, Frank Michelman, and Cass Sunstein have attempted to ground constitutional theory in what they call public values
... [that]

must be different from ones that merely happen to be com-

monly shared .... Sunstein and Michelman explicitly link their vision
to the republican tradition,1 2 67 which conceives of the public interest as
distinct from the aggregate of private interests. "To Owen Fiss, 'adjudication is the social process by which judges give meaning to our public values.'-"268 Michael Perry, Laurence Tribe, Anthony Kronman,
Alexander Bickel, and Edmund Burke are all mentioned (but only just
mentioned) as falling within this category of thinkers. Tushnet is right
to group these disparate critics together; he has a good eye for his list.
But it remains merely a list in the absence of the group's defining characteristic, a definition that would have swept in Tushnet as well: Prudential argument is actuated by a political and economic program as to
which the Constitution itself is agnostic, and thus the prudentialist must
provide a standard external to the Constitution.
IX.

CONCLUSION

A modality is the way in which we determine a form of expression to
264. "The preceding chapters have examined a number of efforts to explain why a small
group of people, called judges, should be allowed to displace the otherwise legally authoritative decisions of a somewhat larger group of people, called legislators, who are selected by
processes that seem closer to the normatively attractive mechanisms of democracy than those
used to select judges." P. 147.
265. Pp. 147-48.
266. Pp. 149-58. Tushnet thus includes Cover, Burt, and James Boyd White, whose
work has nothing to do with describing an ideology that would respond to the
countermajoritarian objections to judicial review.
267. Pp. 160, 162-63.
268. P. 164 (quoting Owen Fiss, Foreword. The Forms of Justice, 93 HARv. L. Rv.1, 2
(1979)).
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be true. For instance, a logical modality may be attributed to a proposition, p, by saying that it is logically necessary, or contingent, or impossible that p. To say that it is now, or will be, or was the case that p,
attributes temporal modality. To say that it is obligatory, permissible,
or forbidden thatp is to mark a moral or deontic mode. To say that it is
known or unknown or known that it is not the case that p, is to employ
an epistemic mode. And so on. 269 By contrast, to say simply thatp, or
it is 'defide true that p,' does not characterize the way in which p is true.
The six forms of constitutional argument are modalities. They are
not true in themselves, but provide criteria by which we can determine
whether statements about the American Constitution are true.
Although there is a certain jargon associated with this idea-that there
are six forms of argument, that they arise from the history, text, doctrine (neutral principles), structure, and so on, that they are associated
with particular constitutional ideologies-one very largely misses the
point by adopting the jargon of six forms without understanding the
fundamental ideas of this sort of analysis.
These six forms are available to any judge; indeed it was their availability as common law forms that recommended them once the power of
the state was subordinated to law by our Constitution. Thus they are
distinct from the ideologies to which they have given birth. A modality
makes no claim as to its truth value; it is a way of determining truth
values. An ideology, by contrast, makes precisely the claim that its way
of looking at things is true. For that reason, it is to the ideology of
textual argument, for example-the whole set of ideas about a tacit social contract, the ongoing nature of the constitutional compact, the assessability of its interpretation to those giving tacit consent, and so
on-that the textualist appeals for justification. Thus, the modalities
may provide legitimacy, but they cannot, in themselves, provide
justification.
Why does all this matter? What difference does it really make if
these six categories are used by an author for some novel purpose?
Where do I get off (do I own these categories?) delivering this rather
didactic introduction to constitutional jurisprudence and calling it a
conclusion to a book review? Understanding the interpretation of the
Constitution in the way I have outlined dooms the very enterprise in
which Tushnet is engaged. Both the procedure-the repeated stylized
attack, like a favorite chess opening, by which he proceeds to demonstrate the infeasibility of the forms of argument-and the substance of
his effort- the endeavor to shatter our rather complacent faith against
the irony of modernism by showing that each form is a pathetic and
inept mask for politics-depend upon a confusion between modality
and ideology. This confusion requires that we augment analysis with
allegations of false consciousness, stupidity, bad faith, and so forth, be269. ANTmoNY Fuw, DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY 235 (1984).
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cause in fact, far from being infeasible, the case reporters are full of
examples of the tasks that Tushnet has shown to be impossible. By
contrast, the ideologies of constitutional jurisprudence are indeed vulnerable to claims of indeterminacy.
It has often been observed, and it is of course true, that our constitutional law reflects a continuing struggle among contending interests
for the privilege of having the government on its side. Our constitutional jurisprudence is a changing product of earnest efforts to enforce
the power of the state against others. In a democracy, publicly appealing reasons must be given for the constitutional proposals for interpretation made by different interests or groups, including even those of
groups who wish to promote common interests. These reasons must,
270
at least, express a perspective that transcends the struggle for power.
Imagine, in Amartya Sen's winsome images about property rules,
the following scene. There is a wooden flute, and there are three boys.
Each boy wants the flute for his own. The first says, "I made that flute;
it belongs to me. Without me there would be no flute." The second
says, "You two have many toys. I have none. That little flute ought to
go to me." The third says, "I am the only one who can play it. I should
have that flute." No doubt if we introduced 7-year-old lawyers into this
scene, they would put their client's claims in more general terms.
These claims seek ideologies as much as they are formed by them (imagine the sense of injustice the boy felt who had the flute taken away!).
Each of the ideologies of constitutional law seeks to justify a certain
pattern of allocation. In my opinion, this search for ideological justification must fail, if only because each inevitably resorts to a circular appeal to its own premises. For example, one must believe in the
legitimacy of historical argument, as a matter of law, before one can
claim that appeals to the intentions of the framers and ratifiers are the
only conscientious method of interpreting the Constitution. This circularity is not the result of indeterminacy, I hasten to add. Indeed, to take
an example offered by Tushnet, the very criteria of the modalities
weaken such an assertion. Tushnet gave us the example of an adolescent believer in reincarnation who wished to run for President. Over
35? Well over, he thought. But this is not really troublesome for the
textualist. Nor is Tushnet on firm ground when he taxes each form of
argument with an inability to meet criteria he has imported from another form (prudentialism); indeed one might almost say this is what it
means to be a distinct form-the ability to impose criteria that are unsatisfied within the other conventional modes.
The ideologies of constitutional law have taken on the structure of
argument; in this way each has criteria to establish legitimacy, for it is
the modalities of argument, and not any foundational ideology, that
270. See Louis Eisenstein, Some Second Thoughts on Tax Ideologies, 23 N.Y.U. INST. FED. TAx.
1, 3 (1965).
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legitimate judicial review. The difficulty arises from this relationship:
Just as the ideologies cannot legitimate-as Tushnet rightly argues-so
the modalities cannot justify. Following the forms of argument not
only does not insure ajust outcome, it does not even give us the means
of assessing our outcomes.
For Tushnet, this means that law is simply politics. Having reached
this conclusion, he taxes the framers as naive: "[They] did not understand that courts are inevitably part of society's governing coalition."' 2 71 He then sets up a political test as the rubric by which to judge
constitutional theory: "An approach to constitutional law . . . is in-

defensible if it would allow judges to uphold the worst and invalidate
the best politically feasible programs. '2 7 2 Finally, he announces this
agenda for future theorists: "The task of constitutional theory ought
no longer be to rationalize .... It should be to contribute to a political
movement that may begin to bring about a society in which civic virtue
2 73
may flourish."
Of course he is right that if you are certain of what civic virtue con-

sists, you will be able to state a program that need not tolerate the contradictions of the multi-valenced scheme of competing modalities.
Such virtue at the moment appears to have been discovered by many to
reside in the "republican tradition." But for the very reasons that have
led him to reject other claims to overarching grand theory, Tushnet is
compelled to concede that the simple adoption of the republican solution is not available to him. Thus, he concludes, in resignation: "The
preceding chapters have . . . suggested that grand theory cannot be

made coherent today because of the erosion of the republican tradition."' 274 Moreover, he is right in identifying the principal theories of
constitutional interpretation as ideologies. 2 75 He writes:
Grand theories are what I will call unitary theories of constitutional
law. Any theory identifies a set of principles from which its results follow, but unitary theories are special in two related ways. First, there
are no conflicts among their principles ....

[S]econd... their results

follow from their principles in a reasonably rigorous way .... The fact
that unitary theories of constitutional law have dominated recent dis271. P. 186. But see J.R. Pole, The Individualist Foundations of American Constitutionalism (n.d.) (unpublished manuscript on file with the Stanford Law Review).
272. P. 186. This would imply that arguments before a judge must be, at least for one
side, "indefensible," because constitutional theory determines the availability of arguments.
A theory that would not "allow" judges to rule either way is a theory that would provide only
one side with legitimate arguments.
273. P. 187.
274. P. 179. It has been suggested before that individual liberty can only be assured
within a community of a certain sort or one possessing a certain public responsibility. Rousseau, for example, maintained that personal liberty depended on the performance of public
services. See JEAN-JACQUEs RoussAu, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT (1762) (M. Cranston trans.
1968). It has also been argued that the qualities required by each person in order to perform
civic duties must be the civic virtues. See Quentin Skinner, The Idea of Negative Liberty, in PHiLOSOPHY IN HISTORY 193 (R. Rorty,J.B. Schneewind & Q. Skinner eds. 1984).
275. See P. BoBBrrr, supra note 3, at 247.
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27 6
cussions provides the preceding chapters with a structure.

But why does he not see the connection between these insights:
that his very certainty is the stuff of ideology (a "unitary theory") and
that it is the collapse of various modalities into a single ideology that is
fatal to the legitimacy of judicial review? Law is not politics any more
than it is history or textual criticism or political philosophy. It is simply
a mistake to suppose that we consult these disciplines to tell ourselves
how to apply a legal rule. We did not derive our modalities of argument and decision from constitutional ideology; they were present in
the common law at the time we created the Constitution. By subordinating state power to law we implicitly superimposed the forms of law
onto the hitherto sovereign state. Doing law-even the law that would
govern the state itself-was not a matter of consulting ideology, though
of course the practice can always be described in ideological terms.
Tushnet's error in this regard is vividly portrayed in what at first appears to be no more than an erudite garnish: a footnote referring to an
essay by Saul Kripke on certain arguments of Wittgenstein regarding
rule-following. Kripke's observation is also picked up elsewhere, in the
text, in part in the following passage:
Consider the following multiple choice question: "Which pair of
numbers comes next in the series 1, 3, 5, 7 ...? (a) 9, 11; (b) 11, 13;

(c) 25, 18." It is easy to show that any of the answers is correct. The
first is correct if the rule generating the series is "List the odd numbers"; the second is correct if the rule is "List the odd prime numbers";
and the third is correct if a more complex rule generates the series.
Thus, if asked to follow the underlying rule-the "principle" of the
series-we can justify a tremendous range of divergent answers
by con2 77
structing the rule so that it generates the answer we want.
At first, this example looks like one taken from Wittgenstein (or
Kripke on Wittgenstein). Wittgenstein repeatedly asks questions such
as, "What justifies us in saying that 1002 follows 1000 in the series of
even numbers, and in dismissing the student's answer 1004 as incorrect?" 2 78 Our usual defenses-that we know what accords with the
rule, that the formula determines what steps to take next-are, as
Wittgenstein shows, mere platitudes. The "rule for even numbers"
might very well be "Go by twos until you hit 1000, then by 22."279
Kripke replies to this skeptical account by relying on the socialization
276. P. 181. This is a clarifying and helpful structure, though not unprecedented. Cf P.
BOBBrr, supra note 3, Book I (Ch. 1: "A Typology of Constitutional Arguments"; Ch. 2:

"Historical Argument"; Ch. 3: "Textual Argument"; Ch.4: "Doctrinal Argument"; Ch. 5:
"Prudential Argument"; Ch. 6: "Structural Argument"; Ch. 7: "Ethical Argument").
277. P. 55 (footnotes omitted).
278. See, e.g., LUDWIG WITFGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS 187 (G.E.M. Anscombe trans. 2d ed. 1958); LUDWIG WrrrGENSTEIN, REMARKS ON THE FOUNDATIONS OF MATH-

EMATICS 3e (G.H. von Wright, R. Rhees & G.E.M. Anscombe eds., G.E.M. Anscombe trans.
1956) [hereinafter REMARKS].

279. See L. WITrGENSTEIN, REMARKS, supra note 278, at 62e.
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process, the community of mathematicians, and so on. 28 0 Similarly, to

account for the apparent consistency in appellate decisionmaking,
Tushnet introduces the explanation of "pressures exerted by a highly
developed, deeply entrenched, homeostatic social structure. ' ' 28 1 But
Wittgenstein's real point, as perhaps even Kripke would concede, is not
that a sociological account solves the problem, but rather that there is
no mediating device that tells us how to apply a rule. When we go to 4,
having written 1, 2, 3, we do not consult a rule. Our following a rule
amounts to no more, and requires no more, than that we do go on
(though of course we can state a rule if asked.) Nor, in my opinion,
could a descriptive sociology explain how a rule could be applied in
new situations. The very fact that any new result is compatible with
some construction of the pre-existing facts defeats this account as thoroughly as the notion that the new application is deduced from the old.
To know how to go on-to know the next number in the series-is all it
means to know how to follow a rule.
But now look a little more closely at Tushnet's example. Wittgenstein is satisfied to join issue even on the extreme case, when the series
is simply 2, 2, 2, 2 ....

and at some point the student introduces a

2
3. 82

Whereas Tushnet's previous example introduced a purposeful ambiguity: Any of the choices strikes us as plausible. We are required to
choose. But Wittgenstein's whole point is that in doing a series the one
thing we do not do is decide. For it is not the skeptic's doubt about
explanation that troubles Tushnet-his very example actually shows
Wittgenstein's point, because we wouldn't see the options as requiring
a choice if we really had no idea how to go on-it is the necessity of
choice. And this, finally, is what Tushnet does not tolerate.
Law's indeterminacy, which the daily observation of ordinary legal
practice, like the observation of children completing arithmetical series,
seems perversely to reproach, does not make law inadequate unless one
believes that legal rules require the inference of a consistent, coherent
rule before one can go on. Unless, in other words, one believes that
the practice requires an ideology of the sort Tushnet calls a "unitary
280. See generally SAUL KRIPE, WrrrGENSTEIN ON RULES AND PRIVATE LANGUAGE (1982).
281. P. 57. Cf P. BoBsrrr, supra note 3, at 52-53.
282. See note 278 supra. I have slightly simplified these examples. For those interested
in studying the question of how one follows or derives a rule, it is not necessary to do so
through mathematical examples. Tushnet may have picked up Kripke (or Peter Winch) on
Wittgenstein as a guide, but one can instead go directly to Wittgenstein's discussions in the
Philosophical Investigations:
"But how can a rule shew me what I have to do at this point? Whatever I do is, on
some interpretation, in accord with the rule."--That is not what we ought to say but
rather: any interpretation still hangs in the air along with what it interprets, and
cannot give it any support. Interpretations by themselves do not determine
meaning.
198, at 80e (emphasis in
L. W rrGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 278,
original); see also discussions of deriving a rule at 156, at 61-62e; 163, at 65-66e; 164, at
66e.
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theory." It is this requirement that leads Tushnet both to mock despair-he claims to be driven to political action since theorizing cannot
provide the solution 2 3 -and to adopt a unitary theory of his own, one
that is quite compatible with supplanting rationalization with political
action.
Tushnet briefly considers the possibility that some sorts of issues
are more amenable to certain modal approaches than to others. This
"strategy is to allocate specific areas of the Constitution to different
grand theories: privacy to moral philosophy, criminal justice to
originalism, the first amendment to representation-reinforcement, and
so on." 2 84 But this "strategy" is clearly insufficient for Tushnet precisely because it requires a decision: how to characterize a case.
But suppose you didn't feel such an ideological need, what then?
Then you might see the multiplicity of modal choice as a necessary
thing. For it is this multiplicity that makes moral choice possible, as
opposed to a single ideology that would dictate such choices. Tushnet
briefly addresses such a possibility, but his fatal confusion of modality
and ideology, precipitated perhaps by his requirements for law and
rules, and a certain lack of perspective on his own modal vantage point,
lead him to dismiss the suggestion. He does not seem to entertain the
possibility of a pluralist, anti-foundational thesis of the sort presented
in Constitutional Fate and, perhaps, in Laurence Tribe's Constitutional
Choices.28 5 Instead, he writes:
Pluralist theories have a respectable philosophical pedigree, but
they cannot be the foundation of the theory of constitutional law. Plu283. "[L]ike Seurat's proposed system of painting, or that projected Universal Algebra
G6del innocently believes Leibnitz to have perfected and mislaid .... " RandallJarrell, Verse
Chronicle, THE NATION, Feb. 23, 1946, reprinted in RANDALL JARRELL, KIPLING, AUDEN & CO.:
EssAYs AND REVIEWS, 1935-1964, at 136 (1981).

284. P. 180. Cf P. BoBBrr, supra note 3:
A particular problem is more or less suited to a particular [modality] when the factual
features of the problem bear a certain relationship to the corresponding factual feature of the Constitution which gives rise to that approach.

Id. at 231.
... The various constitutional arguments and approaches I have discussed are
made possible by corresponding features of our Constitution. A textual argument is
possible only because we have a written Constitution; it is the Constitution's "writtenness," if you will, that enables textual approaches. Historical arguments are possible

because the Constitution was proposed by a deliberative body, and campaigned for,
and ratified by the People, instead of being imposed on the People or announced as
law by fiat. Structural arguments work because the Constitution establishes three
principal, fundamental structures of authority-the three-branch system of national
government, the two-layer system of federalism, and the citizen-state relation. Prudential arguments are a result of our Constitution's rationalist superstructure of
means and ends, of enumerated powers and implied methods, which impose a calculation of benefits. Doctrinal arguments are possible only because of the imposition
of the federal courts onto the constitutional process. Ethical arguments arise from
the ethos of limited government, from the "limited-ness" of our constitutional grant
of power.
Id. at 230.
285. L. TRIBE, supra note 58.
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ralist theories tell those whom they address to think carefully and balance the relevant considerations before arriving at a judgment. That
judgment, however, cannot in the end be defended by more than what
John Rawls and other philosophers call intuitionism. It is perfectly all
right, and perhaps inevitable, that I rely on my intuitions in deciding
what to do and in attempting to persuade others to join me. But, as we
have seen, the situation is different within liberal constitutional theory,
where the issue is who can exercise coercive power over another. Pluralist theories give judges an unreviewable discretion to force on the
is correct, and that discretion is
rest of us what their intuitions tell them
28 6
unacceptable in the liberal tradition.
I am inclined to believe, however, that it is the liberal tradition (taking that to be the tradition of our Constitution and its construction)
that not only permits but requires that judges and presidents and members of Congress resort to their consciences when, having scrupulously
followed the modes that ensure legitimation, there remains a conflict.
An opinion in law-of which ajudicial opinion is only one example-is
not an account of how the result was reached, but of how it can be
legitimately reached. The fact that the final decision is expressed in a
legal account is to say no more than that it is a legal decision. A psychological, theological, or even biochemical explanation is always possible, but that does not make law psychology or theology or
biochemistry.
I conclude that Tushnet misunderstands the law, that he requires
(and thinks the liberal tradition requires) that the law's judgments be
"true" in the way that propositions about the world are true, that he
believes in a set of legal presuppositions that are discoverable in the
absence of legal argument, and that he thinks legal argument depends
on these presuppositions. I think that he believes that judicial review
must be legitimated by a hypothesized causal explanation that is derived from the fashionable sociopolitical theories of the moment, and
that he believes that such theories exist on a privileged plane and are
not themselves simply other, highly stylized moves within another convention-bound game whose only relevance to constitutional argument
is through the prudentialist modality.
I have claimed that, owing to such beliefs, he falls into the error of
demanding of law what only ideology can give, what each "grand theory" promised when other law professors (and attorneys general) demanded similar things of their interpretive schemes (not least of which
was to discredit the very legitimacy of all other approaches).
What is the relevance of this critique? Tushnet is not a cynic, nor
even a revolutionary (which requires less conviction); one does not
write a 300-page book, one half of which is devoted to analyzing
cases, 28 7 if one believes there is no law. Rather, Tushnet is an ironist.
286. P. 182 (footnotes omitted). This issue is also treated in P. BOBBrrr, supra note 78.
287. I have not discussed this second half in this essay. Part II of Red, White, and Blue will
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And this is why it matters: The reification of law into politics does not
save it from the pitiless disillusion that results from unmasking the unsupportable claims of naturalism. Rather it condemns it to parties who
have no need to "rationalize" (who wouldn't in other words have troubled to write Part II of Red, White, and Blue) and who would use law only
to serve programs of an enforced civic virtue. Then the smile of irony
becomes the forced grin of violence. Once lost, the habits of legitimacy
are hard to recover. Is it for this that we should sweep away the forms
within which our law has grown and, decade by decade, not always increasing in every decision, but always increasing nevertheless, steadily
strengthened its command over arbitrary state power?
Mark these lines of Zbigniew Herbert:
First there was a god of night and tempest, a black idol without
eyes, before whom they leaped, naked and smeared with blood. Later
on, in the times of the republic, there were many gods with wives, children, creaking beds, and harmlessly exploding thunderbolts. At the
end only superstitious neurotics carried in their pockets little statues of
salt, representing the god of irony. There was no greater god at that
time.
Then came the barbarians. They too valued highly the little god of
irony. 2They
would crush it under their heels and add it to their
88
dishes.
Tushnet and his important book belong to the second generation of
those who think that law statements are statements about the world; a
true statement in the law will be one that has been brought into line
with the facts of the world. By overlapping this fundamental belief with
the modal perspective given by the forms of argument, he simply works
his way into one form, when it was allegiance to one form that he
wished to escape, and from which a modal perspective promised freedom. I have said that Tushnet is therefore a transition figure, not having quite fully assimilated the insights provided by the forms of
argument-unlike say Robert Post 289 or Akhil Amar 29 ° or Richard Fallon 29 1 or Marc Gold 29 2 and Brian Langille 293 in Canada-but it may be
be familiar to those who have read Professor Tushnet's articles. For example, Chapter 6
("The Constitution of Government") is largely composed of Legal Realism, StructuralReview,
and Prophecy, 8 U. DAYTON L. REV. 809 (1983), Chapter 7 ("The Constitution of the Bureaucratic State") of The Constitution of the Welfare State, 86 W. VA. L. REV. 1077 (1984), Chapter 8
("The Constitution of Religion") of The Constitution of Religion, 18 CONN. L. REV. 701 (1986).
288. Zbigniew Herbert, Mythology, in THE FABER BOOK OF POLITCAL VERSE 422 (C.

Milosz trans. 1986); see also Tushnet, Deconstruction,supra note 81, at 646-47.
289. Robert Post, Theories of Constitutional Interpretation (n.d.) (unpublished manuscript on file with the Stanford Law Review).
290. Akhil Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425 (1987); Akhil Amar,
PhiladelphiaRevisited: Amending the Constitution Outside Article V, 55 U. Cm. L. REV. 1053 (1988);

Akhil Amar, Law Story (Book Review), 102 HARv. L. REV. 688 (1989).
291. Fallon, supra note 40, at 1189.
292. Gold, supra note 40.
293. Brian Langille, The Jurisprudence of Despair and the Search for the Grammar of
Constitutional Law (1988) (unpublished manuscript on file with the Stanford Law Review).
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that he is himself in transition.
Red, White, and Blue (in a comparison that I fear can only displease
both parties) ranks with Laurence Tribe's ConstitutionalChoices in its ambition, erudition, and importance. Tushnet's rejection of the five unitary grand theories, like Tribe's anti-foundationalism, 29 4 deserves
attention, and, I believe, acclaim. Each is its author's bid to achieve the
front rank among constitutional theorists. What disappoints is the
sense one has that precisely what is new and profound in each author's
work is but a veneer on which neither has deeply reflected and to which
neither is deeply attached. Like Hamlet, who has become educated in
the new science but who must return to a society in which superstition
governs, Mark Tushnet is suspended between the new and the old. His
ghost is a rather sentimentalized socialism that would seem dated in
any other industrialized society. He too plans to use his newly acquired
techniques to fulfill a mission. But make no mistake about this: Despite
appearances, he is still gripped by the old paradigms, the old superstitions (like the countermajoritarian objection) that have long dominated
this field. I surmise he is not alone in this.
When I first wrote ConstitutionalFate, I believed it to be a break with
previous thinking on constitutional interpretation, in part because it
shifted the strategy of attention from the expression of a theory to the
study of the nature of theorizing. It would not have been possible without the previous work of others who have explored the ideological underpinnings of forms of argument. ' 29 5 Constitutional Fate, however,
made a topological, not typological, claim that the forms of constitutional argument legitimated constitutional interpretation and accordingly imposed certain interpretive constraints. It did not simply call
attention to the fact that the competing forms of argument differed as
to their interpretive commitments, but rather it attempted to step
outside the ring and indicate what all had in common in the nature of
these commitments and their relationship to the forms of argument.
That is why it expressed no single favored theory of constitutional interpretation, an aim Tushnet repeatedly professes to share but so signally fails to achieve. In some ways the paradigm has shifted; for
example, it is becoming almost commonplace to see the
countermajoritarian dialogue organized along modal lines, 2 96 and it is
becoming more common to see constitutional interpretation treated as
294. Regarding Tribe's anti-foundationalism, see Mark Tushnet, The Unities of the Constitution, 21 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 285, 286-89 (1986).

295. See, e.g., C. BLACK, supra note 13 (isolating a form of argument, structural argument,
for the first time); Deutsch, supra note 133 (analyzing the recursive character of arguments
from neutral principles); see also J.H. ELY, supra note 13; Brest, Original Understanding, supra

note 13; Grey, supra note 13; Tribe, supra note 13 (each focusing on types of argument and
their ideological underpinnings).
296. See, e.g., Daniel Conkle, Toward a General Theory of the Establishment Clause, 82 Nw.

UNIv. L. REv. 1113 (1988).
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a series of legitimizing modalities. 29 7 I did not write ConstitutionalFate,
however, to commence one genre, but to end another. I believe now,
as I did then, that the future useful work to be done in law does not lie
in commentary on criticism but rather in the usual analysis of legal
problems, and such accounts of these problems-economic, anthropological, historical, etc.-as may be useful to that analysis. Rather than
sow a certain jargon, I would leave everything as it is (but the reader).

297. Two recent casebooks are exemplary: W. MuRu's, J. FLEMING & W. HARRIS, supra
note 40; P. SHANE & H. BRUFF, supra note 40. See also Professor Tribe's advice that we must
choose "constrained and channeled by a constitutional text and structure and history, by constitutional language and constitutional tradition," as well as "by who we are and by what we
have lived through." L. TRIBE, supra note 58, at vii.

